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LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS
KNOWING MORE AS KNOWING LESS?
ALTERNATIVE HISTORIES OF COST
AND MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING IN
THE U.S. AND THE U.K.
Abstract: In attempting to understand the genesis and scope of mod-
ern cost and management accounting systems, accounting histori-
ans adopting what has been labeled a “Foucauldian” approach have
been rewriting the history of key 18th and 19th century develop-
ments in the U.K. and U.S. through new evidence, new interpreta-
tion, and a refocusing of attention on familiar events. This is a
“disciplinary” history which sees modern cost and management ac-
counting as articulating a new kind of “expert disciplinary knowl-
edge,” as well as exercising a “disciplinary power,” in the construc-
tion of a new human accountability. However, this “disciplinary”
view has been challenged by more “economic rationalist” historians,
e.g., Boyns and Edwards [1996] for the British Industrial Revolution
and Tyson [1998] for the U.S., as being too narrowly concerned with
labor control.
This paper takes up the gauntlet. It addresses the theo-
retical issues and seeks to clarify the import of the “disciplinary
view” and its contribution to understanding how 19th century ac-
counting practices shaped emerging managerial discourses, initially
in the U.S. It argues that, until businesses adopted this new
disciplinarity, there remained an absence of practices focused on
calculating human performance, and accounting was not fully de-
ployed to construct that system of “administrative coordination”
[Chandler, 1977] which distinguishes modern management action
and control.
 Acknowledgments: The authors express gratitude to the ESRC (grant no.
0023 2405) and the Centre for Business Performance of the ICAEW, without
whose funding support much of the archival research underlying this paper
could not have been undertaken. They are also grateful to the participants in
the 11th Accounting, Business and Financial History Conference, Cardiff, Sep-
tember 15-16, 1999, for their constructive comments on an earlier version of
this paper.
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INTRODUCTION
We are always rewriting the past, whether through new
evidence, new interpretation, or a new focus on old overlooked
events. Revisionism constitutes something newly read into
some particular aspect of the past—a discovery of new evi-
dence, a discerning of new patterns, a dislodging of old and
cherished verities. But what is the knowledge gain? In the flux
of such rewriting, and in the contest of ideas it necessarily
entails, the quality of the new evidence and the plausibility of
the supposed patterns discerned cannot but be questioned.
Knowing more may disintegrate into knowing less; the loss of
the cherished appraised as too high a price to pay.
We surmise that this is very much the situation currently
with the history of cost and management accounting develop-
ments in the U.K. and U.S. during the late 18th and early 19th
centuries. Authors such as ourselves, so-called “Foucauldians,”1
are caught up in just such a proliferation of rewriting. In our
own view, we are caught in the process of refining and redefin-
ing Chandler’s [1977] “visible hand” thesis at all three
abovementioned levels—evidence, interpretation, and refocus.
First, we have added to the evidence that Chandler adduced
for the genesis of modern management by revisiting the sites he
identified where forms of administrative coordination were first
developed. Chandler specified the Springfield Armory as the
place where single-unit management was developed in the con-
text of developing interchangeable-part manufacture, largely
under the superintendency of Roswell Lee. We agree on the
location, but find that administrative coordination was devel-
oped not as a response to the technical breakthrough but as a
separate “disciplinary”2  intervention. Further, credit is ac-
1This identification is an oversimplification as in certain key respects we
depart from Foucault’s own history or go beyond his own analysis of disciplin-
ary practices, discourses, and institutions.
2 “Disciplinarity” as we use it refers to new modes both of knowing and of
exercising power, where the same set of practices—writing, examining, and
grading—are involved in constituting both. Once these practices were trans-
lated into business, they enabled a constant tracking of performance, setting of
targets, evaluation against norms, etc.—all of which became most powerful
when internalized. Thus, a new kind of work control environment developed
within hierarchically networked organization structures. So disciplinary power
is grounded in the application of expert disciplinary knowledges. Our “disci-
plinary” approach therefore does not see modern business as a response to
specifically economic demands, let alone explicable in terms of a calculus of
economic costs and benefits. See further Hoskin and Macve [1986, 1993].
2
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corded not to Lee but to Daniel Tyler, whose systematic work
study in 1832, “watch in hand,” both identified the time that
ought to be taken for each task in musket production and
reengineered that production process as one of consecutive
steps to be followed with minimal bottlenecks. The implemen-
tation of the Tyler-based approach from 1841 produced a new,
managed manufacturing system [Hoskin and Macve, 1988,
1994a].
As we then pointed out, the practices deployed by Tyler in
managing the production system—turning all performance into
writing, subjecting it to close examination, and grading the out-
comes—initiated a world where targets and results were en-
demically produced from the past into the future. These be-
came internalized by being integrated into coordinated systems
of activities, with individuals often provided piece-rate incen-
tives and governed by strict factory time keeping. This analysis
we then applied to Chandler’s [1965, 1977] story of how multi-
unit management was developed on U.S. railroads [Hoskin and
Macve, 1994b]. Here again we saw administrative coordination
as developed through the application of these practices to the
problems of planning, coordinating, and controlling plant and
personnel across extended space and time. We, like Chandler,
saw the first key player as George Whistler on the Western
Railroad, identified by Chandler [1977, pp. 97-98] as the first
(in 1841) to adopt a “modern, carefully defined, internal organi-
zational structure,” making it “the first American business en-
terprise to operate through a formal administrative structure
manned by full-time salaried managers.” The second key rail-
road was the Pennsylvania (PRR), where the separation of fi-
nancial and operating functions was achieved, leading in 1857
to the establishment of what Chandler [1977, pp. 105-106]
called the first “decentralized line-and-staff divisional form of
organization.” Also, the continuous generation and examination
of detailed information flows on both physical and human as-
sets enabled a low-cost, high-efficiency regime to be estab-
lished. “Of all the organizational innovators . . . the Pennsylva-
nia Railroad made the most significant contributions to
accounting” [Chandler, 1977, p. 109].
In all this, we were following Chandler’s evidential trail, but
as we undertook our own searching of the archives we found
new primary sources of evidence.3  We were able to track down
3The researches of O’Connell [1985] and Ward [1971] were also of valuable
assistance. See Hoskin et al. [1998].
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the details of Tyler’s original work, to study first-hand his auto-
biography, and to trace the inscription of the implementation
of his reforms in the Springfield Armory’s payroll records held
in the U.S. National Archives. We could show that Whistler
implemented the new organization structure on the Western in
1839, not 1841, from day one of the railroad’s operation. We
could also challenge Chandler’s view [1977, p. 101] that the
“general principles” of administration were established and that
“the flow of internal information” was first perfected on the
New York and Erie Railroad around 1854-1855, as what ap-
peared to be substantially identical innovations had already
been introduced on the PRR. On the PRR itself, we disputed
Chandler’s identification of J. Edgar Thomson as the key player
and argued for the role of Herman Haupt as the originator of
the significant changes in 1851. As we have further argued
[Hoskin et al., 1998], Haupt’s contribution also included the
first known example of an information-rich approach to strate-
gic thinking, visible in proposals and initiatives from 1853-
1854.
Thus, we began to rewrite Chandler’s general explanation.
In particular, where he saw single and multi-unit management
as two distinct developments, we could see them as two aspects
of a more general breakthrough. First, we could point out how
both sets of developments in administrative coordination were
achieved by people with a common past since Tyler, Whistler,
and Haupt were all graduates of the U.S. Military Academy at
West Point.4  Second, we could suggest that this common past
was decisive, not so much because of its military context but
primarily because of the radically new pedagogic environment
experienced by these West Point cadets. The “disciplinary”
practices involved in both kinds of administrative coordina-
tion—constant writing, examining, and grading—were intro-
duced into West Point by Superintendent Sylvanus Thayer, ap-
pointed to run the Academy in 1817, when both Whistler and
Tyler were cadets in the same cohort.
These young men encountered a radically new learning en-
4Chandler recognized that there were West Pointers in the story and ac-
knowledged the value of their engineering training. However, he overlooked
how they had “learned to learn” under Thayer’s new, disciplinary system
[Hoskin and Macve, 1988], particularly when he focused on the New York and
Erie Railroad and on J. Edgar Thomson rather than Herman Haupt on the
PRR. As he viewed their input as marginal and secondary, he reserved the
invention of “management” to career businessmen.
4
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vironment which was newly disciplinary in a double way. First,
they were subjected to the new discipline of constantly being
made to write, and to be examined and graded on the results of
their writing, and thereby were made subject to a panoptic sys-
tem of surveillance and judgment. Constant record keeping on
each and all, continuously defining their status as measured by
their performance, was internalized in their competition for the
highest rank. Second, they were constrained to acquire a new
and superior expert disciplinary knowledge, based on studying
the works of the French instigators of modern mathematics and
science. These West Pointers were the vanguard of the first U.S.
generation to become mathematically and scientifically literate.
They were well-disciplined, disciplinary experts. Thus, we see
the invention of administrative coordination as simultaneously
an outcome of remaking humans as highly literate and numer-
ate disciplinary experts, “calculating persons” perhaps, who
could then apply their disciplinary knowledge to the coordina-
tion of objects, processes, and humans. This is a powerful new
knowledge system because it is a knowledge-based way of exer-
cising power. That is the power-knowledge interrelation.
Accounting is a significant factor in this transformation to
administrative coordination because it was already there at
hand, functioning in existing economic practices in various
ways. Double-entry and charge-discharge accounting systems
already put values on objects in problematic yet familiar ways.
With the translation of writing, examining, and grading prac-
tices into the economic sphere, an historically new extension of
accounting practice and knowledge occurred. The performance
marks of West Point became the performance dollars of ac-
counting. Accounting began to become newly disciplinary in
the same double sense, as it was extended from being an ac-
counting for objects or the best use of objects to a concomitant
accounting for human performance, including a new kind of
decision making concerned with the best joint use of human
and physical assets within a defined organizational structure of
accountability. Once forms of what we have called “human ac-
counting” began to become integral to the accounting field,
accounting as knowledge discovered its modern status as a dis-
cipline in its own right [Hoskin and Macve, 1993].
Thus, a new power accrued to accounting, but only because
aspects of accounting remained the same. From Roman times
and earlier still [Macve, 1985], as later in double-entry and
charge-discharge formats [Hoskin and Macve, 1986], account-
ing had been a practice that turns events into writing, renders
5
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them open to examination, and puts values on events and ob-
jects. In this respect it continues to remain the same, but at the
same time it gains a new significance because it expands so
effortlessly to take on the “human accounting” dimension. We
then identify, as one precipitate of this expansion, a new dis-
course of accountability. As we have pointed out [Hoskin and
Macve, 1988], accountability is a neologism of this general pe-
riod. We find a reference at Springfield in 1819 to the “system
of accountability” to refer to the proper stewardship of objects.
But the expansion of accounting to incorporate human ac-
counting leads to the term taking on its modern connotation of
a general and human accountability. It becomes a term whose
scope goes beyond being held responsible to identification
through accounting norms as being responsible. Moreover, as
new expertise in the technology of value calculation is created,
one can also be called to account for what is yet to come, which
is now nameable through prediction or prescription.5
In this respect we believe we have captured precisely what
Chandler set out so forcefully in the introduction to The Visible
Hand [1977]; namely, that modern management was a rupture
in economic history. It displaced the power of market mecha-
nisms by inventing a new kind of institution, the managed en-
tity or modern business enterprise. By capturing cost and effi-
ciency benefits internally and enabling a planning and
coordinating of activity across time and space, often by “fiat”
[Coase, 1937], the managed entity preempted, displaced, and
fundamentally remade market relations. Managerialism engen-
dered oligopoly because it was so feasible, via administrative
coordination, to construct large organizations where managers
manage other managers. Such organizations proved able to
generate such economic rents that they could dominate and
remake their sectors, even as they dominated and remade their
work forces. Administrative coordination was, in this sense, a
new kind of power, which has ultimately remade the param-
eters of the economic and organizational worlds.
5None of this says that accounting was not significant before, nor that
individuals were not judged before through their accounts. But these were
traditionally prominent people already identified as significant individuals be-
fore the accounts were prepared. Such stewardship accounting dates from
ancient practice, through medieval estate accounting, to modern times. What
is different about the new human performance measurement is that it created
“calculable persons” within mass populations [Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Miller
and O’Leary, 1987].
6
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In our view, Chandler’s radical insight has become dis-
torted as his work has been claimed by others as an historical
basis for approaches such as transaction cost economics
[Williamson, 1985]. We aim to reassert Chandler’s radical in-
sight, captured in the “visible hand” metaphor, by emphasizing
how the invention of administrative coordination was not, as
such, an economic invention.6  It was, as a combination of writ-
ing, examining, and grading, a means to inventing a new kind
of economic world.7
Our theoretical concern then is to give back to the theory of
the visible hand both its metaphorical and substantive force.
But, of course, such a rewriting occasions questions and dis-
putes over the evidence, the adequacy of the theorizing, and the
refocusing of debate. Thus, the issues of the early 19th century
period, and of the relative significance of U.S. and U.K. devel-
opments, have been posed in acute new ways. Much valuable
new evidence has accrued as a result, something we welcome.
Further, the precise delimitation of terms such as “manage-
ment” has come in for searching question [cf. Hoskin and
Macve, 1990]. The roles of accounting in business and in non-
business contexts have been seen as multiple. New levels of
analysis have therefore proliferated as part of that general re-
writing to which we have contributed.
6Chandler [1977] himself did not believe that the new levels of administra-
tive coordination introduced into the Springfield Armory and the early U.S.
railroads could be explained by economic rationalism as they were introduced
primarily by salaried managers rather than entrepreneurial owners, and their
sophistication went beyond what was needed for adequate coordination of
business activity and for economic survival.
7In this world, there are arguably three key precipitates, each of them a
direct product of the new combination of disciplinary practices. First, there is
a new form of the “subject” or self, as the calculable/calculating person. Sec-
ond, there is a new form of “organizing,” as a process of reticulation or net-
working. Here constant writing, examining, and grading make possible the
hierarchical and accountable connection of subjects and groups of subjects
into entities that therefore seem made up of interconnected parts. Third, yet
concomitantly, comes the regime of information as a precipitate of our
“grammatocentrism.” In our organizations as much as ourselves, the second-
ary rewriting of events, acts, and objects becomes increasingly primary. From
the topmost manager to the lowest managee, working life is directed and
shaped via the circulation of multiple narrative and calculative texts. Decision
is translated into a choosing from among the set of written, examined, and
graded alternatives at hand. We therefore find profoundly problematic any
theory that takes as its objects of analysis the subject as rational, the organiza-
tion as structure, and information as objective.
7
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In particular, historians representing the “neoclassical revi-
sionist”8  or “economic rationalist” school of thought have es-
tablished more clearly that elaborate accounting reports were
prepared in U.S. private enterprises from the early 19th cen-
tury, such as at the Waltham-Lowell mills [Tyson, 1998] and
later at Waltham Watch [Fleischman and Tyson, 1996]. They
were equally found in major industrial enterprises in Britain
[Edwards et al., 1995; Boyns and Edwards, 1996, 1997a, 1997b;
Fleischman and Parker, 1997]. Such accounting reports served
management decision making in these sites, they argue, and
entities became coordinated into increasingly large-scale indus-
trial enterprises, in developments that they see as rational eco-
nomic responses to the demands placed on management by
technological innovation and economic growth.
Economic rationalist historians, based on archival evidence
from the U.K., attempt to demonstrate the utilization of an
array of accounting practices that still form part of the
accountant’s portfolio of techniques today. Accounting was a
vital ingredient in contractual arrangements between owners,
whether among the partners in a firm or in organizing and
monitoring the operation of owners’ cartels. It informed man-
agers’ concerns with expenditure control, with evaluating tech-
nical efficiency improvements through increased mechaniza-
tion, and with major operational expansion/contraction
decisions. Recent evidence from significant British Industrial
Revolution (BIR) industries, such as Boulton & Watt’s Soho
Foundry, the Dowlais mining/ironworks complex, and the
Northeast collieries [Fleischman et al., 1995; Boyns and
Edwards, 1996, 1997a; Fleischman and Macve, 2000], has rein-
forced the evidence from the work of earlier historians [Stone,
1973; Jones, 1985] as to the variety of accounting’s contractual
and managerial roles. It also has contributed to refuting
Pollard’s oft-quoted conclusion [1965, p. 248] that “the practice
of using accounts as direct aids to management was not one of
the achievements of the British industrial revolution.”9  Conse-
quently, these researchers would argue that the prime focus of
research into the management accounting history of this period
should be on investigating this variety of ways in which modern
8For the content of “neoclassical revisionist” history, see Loft [1995].
9Some guarded recognition of the significance of this new evidence is
given in Wilson’s [1995, pp. 29-31] synthesis of British business history.
8
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accounting practices developed, to meet the demands of a range
of organizational objectives under varying conditions.10
It has not been our purpose to deny the sophistication of
the accounting practices developed in the BIR; indeed, they
offer some of the earliest exemplars of the range of accounting
practices also found in early industrial enterprises in the U.S.
and elsewhere. But, given the disciplinary framework of analy-
sis we have adopted, we would argue that the extension of such
modern accounting techniques does not in itself explain the
fullness of modern accounting’s power. Instead, one must ad-
dress the question posed by Miller and Napier [1993, p. 632] of
“the extent to which ‘successful’ accounting methods transform
the entities and practices of which they provide a calculative
knowledge.” The issue, we suggest, is to identify how far there
is an integration of the accounting into the disciplinary nexus
of practices.
As specific subquestions, one may ask, how far does organi-
zing as reticulation in the sense of constructing networks of
individuals and spaces for decision making, action, and cre-
ation of corporate identities become endemic? How far does
the population of organizational selves become calculable and
calculating? How far is there a privileging of information as
objective? These, we suggest, are the key features of the new
economic world of the modern business enterprise. Only in this
context does accounting, we suggest, develop its distinctive
modern power and status as a valuing technology, via its objec-
tification, classification, and surveillance of human perfor-
mance.11  This is why we have seen the crucial historical ques-
tion, the crux, for historians of management accounting as the
identification of sites where and when human accounting was
initiated. Demonstration of accounting’s presence and useful-
10For example, Fleischman and Parker [1991] rated historical management
accounting practices along four dimensions: cost control, overhead account-
ing, decision making, and standard costing.
11Thus, do we enter the world of which Miller can say, “Far from being
neutral devices for mirroring the social world, the calculative technologies of
accountancy are complex machines for representing and intervening in social
and economic life. Along with allied expertises, the creation of calculating
selves and calculable spaces enables a normalization of individual lives that is
cast in financial terms. The visibility conferred on the calculating self who
occupies a specific locale within a loosely assembled network of calculable
spaces is intrinsically linked to norms of financial performance. Ways of
organizing and ways of calculating have developed hand in hand” [Miller,
1992, pp. 78-79].
9
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ness in other ways, traditional or new, while important, is no
longer enough.
In spite of a growing fashion for accepting pluralities of
theoretical approaches and of methodologies in accounting his-
tory research [Carnegie and Napier, 1996; cf. Oldroyd, 1999],
we find that a number of recent papers have directly attacked
our own theoretical arguments and interpretations of evidence
and charged that we have misread and misunderstood the his-
torical significance of a variety of 19th century accounting de-
velopments. We therefore now turn to face our critics and re-
view the evidence so far obtained from the archives of a
number of significant early BIR and U.S. organizations. We
continue to maintain that, despite a variety of conditions, no
evidence of the application of our type of human accounting
has yet been found in the U.K. at the time when such a develop-
ment is observable in certain seminal organizations in the U.S.
Nor is that development explicable within the U.S. in non- or
antidisciplinary terms. On the contrary, even where the evi-
dence at first appears to lead elsewhere, we argue that it actu-
ally proves to reinforce the disciplinary explanation of modern
management’s genesis.
Of course, a proviso must be offered. We recognize that
archival evidence alone can never enable us to resolve the de-
bate between the neoclassical revisionist and Foucauldian per-
ceptions of the processes by which modern accounting and
modern management evolved.12  Our thesis remains as subject
to falsification by evidence yet to come as any other. An accu-
mulation of such evidence therefore remains essential in order
to enable us to piece together more of the jigsaw of our theo-
retical understanding of how such developments occurred.
The structure of the rest of the paper is as follows. The next
section sets out our concerns over the adequacy of conventional
economic rationalist analysis as a sufficient explanation of the
development of accounting’s modern power. We also indicate
briefly how our approach may be seen as relating to the recent
12The cases of Boulton & Watt, Dowlais, the Northeast coal mines, and
other BIR firms examined to date constitute only negative archival evidence in
the matter of a possible U.K. breakthrough to managerialism. We see U.S.
cases such as the Lowell-Waltham mills in a similar light [Hoskin and Macve,
1996], to be distinguished from sites such as the Springfield Armory and cer-
tain early railroads in the matter of where and when the breakthrough was
made.
10
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work on U.K. and U.S. developments. We then focus in follow-
ing sections on historical works that have directly or indirectly
attacked our evidence and/or framework. We note here that we
are frequently criticized for being too narrow, in particular for
focusing purely on labor productivity or standard costing. We
hope it is clear from the theoretical discussion above that this is
not our general concern. At the same time, we recognize that
there have been papers [e.g., Hoskin and Macve, 1994a, 1996]
where we have focused on demonstrating specific aspects of
our case, such as the details of management’s development at
the Springfield Armory, which may have led this part of our
analysis to be taken as an adequate proxy for the whole. Subse-
quently, we provide brief responses to the critique put forward
in some of the major recent papers and books by Boyns and
Edwards, and by Tyson in sole-authored and joint papers, con-
cerning our interpretation of historical developments. We then
consider how our theoretical approach might be reconciled
with the views expressed in surveys of recent work in account-
ing history, such as those of Miller et al. [1991], Stewart [1992],
Miller and Napier [1993], Loft [1995], Carnegie and Napier
[1996], Fleischman et al. [1996], Funnell [1996, 1998], and
Oldroyd [1999]. We offer a brief summary of our conclusions
on the debate so far. The concluding section sets out our view
of the priorities for further research into the paths by which the
networks that transmitted the “new” 19th century accounting
were extended, apparently first in the U.S., subsequently in the
U.K. and Europe, and now increasingly globally. Accounting’s
history must be rewritten so that we and other researchers,
while discarding some currently cherished knowledge along the
way, will indeed arrive at “knowing more.”
ECONOMIC RATIONALISM: AN INSUFFICIENT
EXPLANATION OF ACCOUNTING’S ROLE IN THE
HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF BIG BUSINESS
The economic rationalist view of accounting’s history over
the last quarter of this millennium offers an appealingly simple,
functionalist account of technical response to the changing eco-
nomic demands of the industrial revolution and the rise of big
business. By Occam’s razor, we should avoid elaboration of
more complex explanations if a simple one will do. Why is the
economic rationalist explanation unsatisfactory? There are
three interconnected levels at which it must be challenged—the
theoretical, the evidential, and the historiographical.
11
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The Theoretical Level: The new accounting practices of the 18th
and 19th centuries are argued by our critics to have provided
necessary tools for management decision making and coordina-
tion of increasing complexity in new industrial revolution and
managerial revolution firms. Others who have evaluated the
practices of routine cost accounting from the perspective of
economic theory, in particular its handling of the rapidly esca-
lating burden of fixed costs that characterized the economics of
the increasingly capital-intensive operations of these firms,
have long condemned these routine practices as inadequate, if
not downright inappropriate, for supplying the information
needed by owners/managers for optimal allocation of resources.
Particular culprits are the calculation of depreciation cost, the
abandonment of the calculation of implicit interest cost, and,
more generally, the arbitrary allocation of fixed overhead cost,
driven by an emphasis on calculating average actual unit costs
of products. Past total unit costs are themselves of little rel-
evance to, and indeed may distort, rational decision making
[Coase, 1938; Wells, 1978; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; cf. Boyns
and Edwards, 1997a].
Such theoretical critiques of accounting practice are them-
selves largely founded in theoretical neoclassical economics
and a model of decision making that is atomistic and choice-
theoretic, concerned with “constrained optimisation” [Jones,
1997]. However, more recent institutional versions of this
rational economics, as applied to the new, large 19th century
firms, do focus more on the relative transaction costs (more
generally, information costs) of economic coordination through
firms rather than markets [Casson, 1997]. They also address the
particular strategic capabilities that provide individual firms
with competitive advantage, whether they be innovators or es-
tablished firms [Best, 1990; Kay, 1993]. These capabilities are
argued to include a firm’s particular structural architecture, the
appropriate balance between formal, internal rules and organi-
zational routines, on the one hand, and the flexibility needed to
innovate and adapt to change on the other.
This line of economic analysis opens up a role for account-
ing routines in facilitating the construction and monitoring of
activity both internal and external to business organizations.
For more mainstream economists, the focus here is on how
accounting assists with the construction and monitoring of the
nexus of contracts, both formal and implicit, that is their heu-
ristic model for the analysis of the economic structure of busi-
12
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ness organizations [Coase, 1937; Jensen and Meckling, 1976;
Williamson, 1985].13
This literature of transaction cost economics focuses pri-
marily on analyzing the optimal equilibrium organizational
structure, given inter alia the potential benefits and costs of
alternative information systems. It has little if anything to say
either about the processes by which firms emerge, grow, and
survive/decay, or about the observed variety of organizational
forms at different times and in different countries [Perrow,
1986; cf. Best, 1990; Casson, 1997; Jones, 1997; Gwilliam et al.,
2000]. Nevertheless, it has enabled the forging of a strong link
between economic theory and business history, as its theoriza-
tion of the inevitability of large industrial firms [Williamson,
1985] fits with Chandler’s [1990] history of the 19th and 20th
century growth of the U.S. managerial firm, ultimately repre-
sented by the multidivisional, multinational “M-form” busi-
ness.14
A significant criticism, however, of all current accounting
history, both traditional and new, would be its relative lack of
reciprocal success to date in penetrating the core of modern
organizational theorization. While some historians, in addition
to Chandler, have begun to recognize accounting’s significance
as the ideal of modern administrative efficacy in connecting the
world to what Latour [1987] has called “centres of calculation”
[Porter, 1995, pp. 50-51], there has been little identification in
mainstream management texts of the importance of accounting
practices in contributing to alternative approaches to the design
of organizational strategy and structure. As argued recently by
Boyns and Edwards [1997b], the conventional wisdom in U.K.
business history persists in concluding that there was little in
the development of cost and management accounting tech-
niques in U.K. businesses that has been shown to be significant
to the development of those businesses before the end of the
13This analysis is also consistent with recent theoretical research on
accounting’s role in facilitating incentive-compatible contracts for managers
within an agency theory structure, focusing on the conflicting objectives of
organizational participants [e.g., Feltham and Xie, 1994; Gietzmann, 1995;
Wagenhofer, 2000]. It is also consistent with the traditional historical impor-
tance of audited accounting reports in monitoring stewardship, partnership,
and other agency contracts, as well as linking to accounting’s more modern
external roles in relation to capital markets and regulatory compliance.
14We discuss critiques of Chandler’s thesis in the historiographical section
below.
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19th century, despite increasing recognition in recent years of
the work of economic rationalist accounting historians (e.g.,
Boyns and Edwards themselves and Fleischman and Parker).
The challenge therefore remains to develop the theory of
how business accounting became powerful, in such a way as to
persuade skeptical, mainstream business and economic histori-
ans that an understanding of accounting is vital, if not central,
to their own agendas. An heroic challenge [Hoskin and Macve,
1993; cf. Napier, 1996a, 1996b]!
Under a transaction or information cost approach, it may
be argued that cost and management accounting routines con-
ferred comparative advantage on those businesses that adopted
them as compared with those that did not, even though they
were suboptimal.15  Thus, the arguments of Coase [1938] and
Wells [1978] might be theoretically correct but not relevant.
However, economic rationalists could only argue that
suboptimality would have been consciously preferred to
optimality ex ante, if decision makers would also have been able
to evaluate ex ante the likely costs and benefits of differing
degrees of sophistication in potential accounting calculations.
This seems implausible.16
A more plausible version of this theory, as in Boyns and
Edwards [1996, 1997a], is that the accounting routines found in
the archive emerged as an intensification, modification, or
byproduct of existing routines used for other purposes. If sub-
sequently found to confer some economic advantage, even if
not ideally suited for the purpose, what began as supplemen-
tary to economic management increasingly became central.17
Then ex post, the costs of moving from existing suboptimal
procedures to more sophisticated procedures may have ap-
peared as prohibitive and imposed a path dependency that con-
strained the final outcome.
However, it would be theoretically much more compelling
to identify first what led to the original adoption of those pre-
15This argument is advanced by Tyson [1998] although it is not developed
there.
16A similar objection may be made to the idea that firms are able to evalu-
ate ex ante the relative transaction costs of firm versus market organization as
posited by Coase and Williamson [Jones, 1997].
17By extension such routines could be suboptimally useful for a number of
purposes, albeit ideally suited to none. Such an explanation resuscitates
Derrida’s [1976] idea that there is a “logic of the supplement,” as discussed in
Hoskin and Macve [1993].
14
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cursor routines, and to investigate whether their adoption re-
lated to some other organizational, social, or economic
changes, and only then to consider what particular changes in
internal conditions provided the opportunity for their success-
ful modification. This has been a focus of our own agenda.18
Given that wider explanatory frame, economic rationalists
might then wish to demonstrate, by analogy with evolutionary
biology, how modified or intensified suboptimal practices did
actually contribute a new economic advantage, and why, where
they then remained in place, they were not in turn replaced by
further superior alternatives.
But to say, as they tend to, that the routines found in the
archive must have represented the optimal trade off of costs
and benefits (given the decision-making and other uses that
economic rationalists wish to attribute to such routines) is em-
pirically empty and essentially tautological. What is still gener-
ally missing is an historical explanation for why particular rou-
tines and their subsequent modifications were the ones that
were actually chosen and why consideration/experimentation
was not given to possible alternatives that may have been even
more cost-beneficial [Casson, 1997].19
The economic rationalists identify the adoption of cost and
management accounting routines with the provision of infor-
mation for improved decision making. But how are these to be
linked? By way of illustration, take, for example, an accounting
information signal, such as “cost” or “profit,” that is correlated,
albeit imperfectly, with the “true” economic performance of the
item of interest. The calculation of the measure signaled may
originally be a byproduct of some other accounting routine;
e.g., the maintenance of double-entry records for the purpose of
basic accountability over resources [Yamey, 1949]. Such a sig-
nal may be superior to no information, or to less well-corre-
lated signals. But if the signal is still very “noisy,” it is only
likely to be advantageous for decision making on average; e.g.,
where there is a routine repetition of decision outcomes, as in
continuous statistical quality control of an operational process.
18For example, Hoskin and Macve [1996] argued that the use of precise,
but arbitrary, unit costings at the Waltham-Lowell mills emerged from the
steps needed to perform calculative routines, and from the need to check their
accuracy, in an age of calculation by hand. Tyson’s [1998] critique of this
paper is discussed further below.
19Oldroyd [1999] pointed out the force of “inertia.” However, we also need
an explanation for the historical changes that do occur.
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Accounting certainly can and does provide such statistics. Such
a noisy signal will, however, generally be of little value for the
major, more strategic decisions on pricing, output, and scale of
investment and on fixing performance rewards. The latter has
been the major focus of economic rationalist historians in argu-
ing for the importance of 19th century management accounting
developments [Boyns and Edwards, 1997b; Tyson, 1998]. Yet,
accounting routines for the reporting of costs and profits are
generally regarded as extremely noisy [Edey, 1970].
This noise further implies that, given the existence of in-
creasingly standardized accounting routines, the comparative
advantage, ceteris paribus, will lie with those firms that under-
stand how to use them to best advantage,20  or how best to
combine them with other sources of information. This in turn
means that the focus of archival enquiry needs to be as much
on the material that provides insight into the contexts within
which these accounting systems were employed and inter-
preted, as it does on the evidence of the accounting records
themselves. This kind of approach is consistent with those or-
ganizational theories that see the secret of successful architec-
ture in the balance of routine/nonroutine and formal/informal
systems [Kay, 1993; Casson, 1997]. We discuss these issues fur-
ther in the next sections on the evidential and historiographical
levels.
The Evidential Level: The argument here can be stated briefly. It
is not generally possible to deduce from the existence of the
routine, formal accounting records themselves the purpose or
purposes to which the information was put.21  As will be dis-
cussed further below, even economic rationalists generally have
to admit that, while they (like us) can produce evidence of an
impressive array of increasingly complex, routine cost account-
ing records, both in the U.K. and the U.S., they are generally
only able to suggest how the information could potentially have
20The history of cost accounting is replete with examples of situations
where divisions, processes, or products appeared unprofitable under the basis
of overhead allocation adopted, so that the management wisely changed the
basis [Wells, 1978, p. 84].
21This contention lies at the heart of much of Yamey’s work in demolishing
the claims of those who have seen the emergence of double-entry bookkeeping
in the 13th century as an essential tool of a new “rational capitalism” [Yamey,
1949]. Similar skepticism needs to be applied to the accelerating emergence of
elaborate cost accounting records in the 19th century.
16
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been utilized [Tyson, 1992, 1998; Boyns and Edwards, 1997b].
The major exceptions, of course, are 1) those records that ex-
plicitly compute future outcomes, which can only have been
prepared in the context of decision making or negotiation, and
2) those records that were clearly prepared as the basis for
contractual negotiations or ex post settling up.
Apart from these clear exceptions, the existence of the for-
mal records of past performance, normally identified with
double-entry accounting ledgers and supporting analyses, do
not in themselves help us to deduce the internal management
purposes for keeping them. How they were used is also prob-
lematic, other than very broadly as a potential statistical data
base from which data might be extracted and/or extrapolated
for estimates of future outcomes and ex post checks on actual
outcomes as, for example, at Dowlais [Boyns and Edwards,
1997a]. But accounting is much more than useful statistics. If it
were not, it is hard to understand how it developed so dramati-
cally beyond being just one more of the tools in the manager’s
toolkit, providing the basis for the emergence of a much more
highly rewarded, stand-alone profession [Matthews et al.,
1998].
In summary, one must remember the old historian’s
maxim. When one is reduced to arguing “it is likely that . . . ” or
“there can be no doubt that . . . ,” one generally means “there is
no evidence that . . . ”
The Historiographical Level: While Chandler’s history has been
contested as an explanation for the growth of firms outside the
U.S. [Hannah, 1983, 1991; Jones, 1994], it represents what is
now the conventional template for describing and explaining
the relative growth of big business on both sides of the Atlantic
[Payne, 1988; Schmitz, 1993]. It has also been used by Boyns
and Edwards [1996] as a framework for exploring the role of
accounting systems in the development of complex business
enterprises, such as Dowlais in the 19th century in the U.K.22
Even within this historico-theoretical account of the con-
struction of large business organizations, the role and signifi-
cance of routine cost and management accounting practices
remain problematical. Both the economic rationalist and disci-
plinary frameworks of accounting history, in so far as they
22However, in Boyns and Edwards [1997a] they argued against a
Chandlerian explanation of developments at Dowlais in the 1850s.
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build on Chandler’s pioneering work, emphasize the value of
the new routines of accounting among the range of practices
which characterize the emergence of the new managerial firms.
Here managers control other managers and ultimately, in an
increasingly global environment, top managers are themselves
controlled not by individual, entrepreneurial owners, but by the
corresponding managerial hierarchies of financial institutions,
competitors, suppliers, auditors, and/or regulators. All of these
are subject to ever-increasing internal and public accountabil-
ity. Their decisions and actions are scrutinized not only for
their financial efficiency but also for their disinterested objec-
tivity. These demands bring unremitting political, social, and
economic pressure to emphasize the transparency of the proc-
ess by which decisions are taken and actions monitored. The
focus is on verifiable outputs or performance indicators rather
than on the underlying value of the outcomes of those decisions
and actions [Brunsson, 1989]. The processes of accounting sys-
tems and the quantifiable output measures that they report are
among the practices that are most accommodating to this insa-
tiable need for more and more seemingly objective verification
[Porter, 1995; Power, 1997].
In this context it is somewhat paradoxical to find ourselves
often being criticized for the narrowness of our view of man-
agement accounting [Boyns and Edwards, 1996; Tyson, 1998].
For our distinctive emphasis has been on the constitutive role
of accounting practices and discourses in the widespread 19th
century development of the new kind of human performance
measurement which created “calculable persons” within mass
populations [Hoskin and Macve, 1986; Miller and O’Leary,
1987].23  If anything, we might have expected to be criticized
more for a tendency to see everything modern as yet another
accounting, thereby failing to identify important differences be-
tween the development of particular business accountings and
other modes of accountability and calculative routine.
What we do have here is a major historical question: what
is the connection, if any, between those business accounting
developments that both we and economic rationalist account-
ing historians have charted from the late 18th century and
23Practices that we have labeled “grammatocentric” [Hoskin and Macve,
1994b].
18
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these wider developments in accountability and, in particular,
in calculative technologies?24
If there is none, accounting’s history may still be important
purely from a business perspective although, as already ob-
served, the limited theorization to date of its importance within
the economic rationalist framework, both at the general level
and, more significantly, in respect of specific accounting tech-
niques, has so far prevented its entry into the mainstream of
business history and organizational theory. But a potentially
greater illumination still lies in identifying wider linkages to
changes in economic organization and society, to the phenom-
ena of increasingly global markets, and to rapid advances in
information technology, and new reflexivities between social
structures and individual actions and freedoms, now deemed
among the key characteristics of modernity [Giddens, 1991,
1999]. The quest may fail. But if it is to succeed, it suggests that
a priority for the accounting history research agenda is a focus
on the relationship between accounting developments and the
wider historical developments in creating “calculable persons in
calculable spaces” [Miller, 1992]. This focus has been central to
our own research agenda [Hoskin and Macve, 1994b], as well as
to our work with collaborators from a more economic rational-
ist tradition.
This has led us, when it comes to specific research ques-
tions, to argue that the historical crux is to identify the disconti-
nuity between early attempts at costings for accountability, de-
cision making, and control purposes, and what may be seen as
the modern approach based in a human accounting. Hence we
argue, in terms of tracing a new “normalization of human ac-
tion,” for the need to trace where, when, and why labor stand-
ards were first articulated and systematically implemented,
when the focus shifted from machines to men. Such standards
introduce new practices and a discourse which extends beyond
the engineering standards that assess materials and machine
efficiency to the establishment of norms of human performance
for modern managerial control [Fleischman et al., 1995].25  It is
24In this respect, Miller and Napier [1993] asked pertinent historical ques-
tions, even though we would argue that the conclusions they drew as to the
relevant archive were largely misplaced.
25Reference to labor standards does not imply the full panoply of labor
standard costs and variance analysis that developed as part of the Taylorist
efficiency movement of the late 19th/early 20th century [Fleischman et al.,
1995, pp. 166-167]. Tyson [1998] here missed the point at issue (see below).
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only a first, but it is nonetheless a crucial, step towards invent-
ing the modern, increasingly internalized, human account-
ability, not just of labor but of all organizational participants,
including all ranks of management, in a “hierarchy of mutual
surveillance” that extends throughout and outwith the organi-
zation [Ezzamel et al., 1990].
It was in addressing this specific research question that
Fleischman et al. [1995] found that, although Boulton & Watt
was an engineering firm in the vanguard of BIR accounting
practice in the sophistication of its records, the transition from
highly sophisticated engineering standards for the material
components of constructed steam engines to comparable stand-
ards of economic performance and labor efficiency was not
achieved, despite an initial, impressive attempt around 1800.
The famous piece-rate regime for which the firm has become
renowned was found to be an isolated episode that did not
presage the birth of modern managerialism. The historical dis-
continuity, the crux which introduced systems of control disci-
pline of the kind that, through internalization of performance
norms, nowadays “quietly order us about” [Foucault, quoted in
Megill, 1979, p. 493] was still to occur.
Both Fleischman et al. [1995] and Boyns and Edwards
[1996] called for confirming evidence to support the findings
about Boulton & Watt in a wider application. And, as an ex-
ample, Boyns and Edwards’s own work [1996, 1997a] on the
Dowlais ironworks demonstrated that accounting control over
labor was not one of the features of the increasingly sophisti-
cated use of the accounting system there in the mid-19th cen-
tury.26  Clearly more work needs to be done, and indeed the
focus of various economic rationalist historians on unearthing
the range of early accounting developments is itself grist to our
mill. For the more evidence that is forthcoming of the sophisti-
26More recently, Fleischman and Macve [2000] have reexamined the
archive of the coal mines of the Northeast of England during the late 18th and
early 19th centuries. Their examination of the records shows, once again, that
detailed accounts were kept of output and of the efficiency of inputs of materi-
als and use of equipment (horses and engines). In this regard, their findings
reinforce the growing evidence of the sophistication of BIR cost accounting,
roughly dated 1750-1850, back to its origins in the 18th century. But, strikingly
absent is any correspondingly detailed examination of human performance to
provide a scientific determination of what should be a “fair-day’s pay for a fair-
day’s work” as a basis for setting the piece rates for the miners, a practice that
we have identified in particular U.S. contexts in the first half of the 19th
century [Hoskin and Macve, 1994a].
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cation of accounting developments in many other respects,
both in the U.K. throughout most of the 19th century and in the
U.S. before the Springfield Armory episode and the organiza-
tion of the railroads [Hoskin and Macve, 1988, 1994], the more
striking to us is the absence of what we call “human account-
ability.”27
As we shall set out in our conclusions, this focus on the
specific research question of how this kind of human account-
ability was introduced does not constitute our whole research
agenda. However, we do regard it as a key piece of the jigsaw if
we are to understand how the new power of accounting has
changed both business strategy and its structure.
We now turn to the specifics of our critics’ attacks. In order
to avoid much repetition and the temptation to wander into
interminable byways of alternative refutations of possible alter-
native interpretations given by one author of another, we set
out here a highly simplified schema of our own view of the
crucial discontinuities and linkages in the development of mod-
ern management accounting. Certain points are already sup-
ported by our own research and that of others to date; other
components are still tentative and need further research, in-
cluding further reexamination of archives which others have
previously interpreted differently. We shall then be able to dis-
tinguish those of our critics’ arguments which we consider re-
flect a misunderstanding of our own position and those where
we have substantive disagreements to resolve. We therefore
present the following propositions which will be subsequently
referenced by the corresponding letter:
A) Accounting has always embraced cost and management
accounting in the sense of analysis of activity and the use of
accounting information for choosing, planning, and controlling
activity.28  These purposes remained embryonic until choice be-
tween significant economic alternatives became available
27While we have been criticized [Boyns and Edwards, 1996; Tyson, 1998]
for the “narrowness” of our approach, and apparently been ignored by Miller
et al. [1991] and Carnegie and Napier [1996], we would hope that accounting
historians who do not share our own theoretical lens would nevertheless find
value in the archival data that we and our collaborators have unearthed on the
range of accounting practices in the U.S. and U.K. enterprises that we have
ourselves examined. That is as much, perhaps, as an historian can legitimately
ask of professional colleagues, however strong his or her own theoretical pri-
ors [de Ste. Croix, 1981].
28We accept, of course, that such concepts are part of a modern mentality
which cannot be literally translated to earlier times [Miller and Napier, 1993].
21
Hoskin and Macve: Knowing more as knowing less? Alternative histories of cost and management accounting in the U.S. and the U.K.
Published by eGrove, 2000
Accounting Historians Journal, June 2000112
[Macve, 1985]. They clearly gained a new intensity in the indus-
trial revolution as technological innovation accelerated, as well
as acquiring a much more significant role in enabling the coor-
dination of large enterprises. The extent of those changes is an
important area of accounting history research. At the same
time, the financial aspect of accounting’s role also intensified
with the increasing separation of ownership and management
and the increasing replacement of individual capitalist entre-
preneurs by passive, dispersed shareholders [Yamey, 1977].
B) These 18th-19th century developments occurred in both
the U.S. and the U.K.,29  but at different times and to different
extents, reflecting, inter alia, the longer persistence of family-
owned and managed firms in the U.K. and a greater emphasis
on informal and social methods of control in the U.K. versus
formal, rational, and objective methods in the U.S.30  The differ-
ing developments in management accounting are paralleled by
differing developments in financial accounting. The profes-
sional influence of auditors came earlier in the U.K.
[Armstrong, 1985; Matthews et al., 1998] while formalized
standardization and regulation of accounting and auditing
practice under the aegis of the SEC came much earlier in the
U.S. [Macve, 1997].
C) A leading characteristic of modernity, certainly by the end
of the 19th century, is the creation of “calculable persons in
calculable spaces” [Miller, 1992], a new objectification of hu-
man performance and normalization of individuals within large
statistical populations, linked also to new modes of state inter-
vention in economic and business affairs. Given that rapid
population growth and mass employment are features of the
18th-19th century economy on both sides of the Atlantic, it is
relevant to enquire how far the significant discontinuity from
which this characteristic of modernity has emerged may be ar-
gued to have had its genesis nearer to the beginning rather than
to the end of the 19th century [Hacking, 1990; Defert, 1991;
Ewald, 1991], and how far it is associated with changes in the
management of business itself.
29There is not space in this paper to consider developments in other 18th-
19th century industrializing countries, although we mention the case of France
briefly below.
30These characteristics, in turn, reflect the very different social history of
the two countries, especially given the largely indigenous population of the
U.K. versus the highly immigrant population of the U.S.
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D) “Ways of organizing and ways of calculating have devel-
oped hand in hand” [Miller, 1992, pp. 78-79]. In the U.S., sig-
nificant changes in the organization of business structure and
accounting, linked to changes in business strategy, have been
identified by Chandler at the Springfield Armory in the 1830s
and on the railroads beginning in the 1840s. Our own reexami-
nation of these archives has identified the most significant of
these developments, both at Springfield and on the railroads,
with engineers who were graduates of West Point, where their
education under the new system introduced by Superintendent
Thayer from 1817 was based on writing, examining, and grad-
ing all aspects of a student’s performance, within a highly
divisionalized and decentralized administrative structure. We
argue that this disciplinary experience was a major factor influ-
encing the approach taken by these graduates to the business
reorganizations in which they played a leading role. They incul-
cated a new “grammatocentric” power-knowledge regime of
management practices and discourses, which, following
Foucault’s [1977] analysis of modern knowledge and power in
society generally, may be seen as comprising a system of objec-
tification of human performance within a hierarchy of mutual
surveillance. Both Springfield and the railroads were also im-
portant centers for the diffusion of new technologies, including
these new technologies of management, so that the changes
there had a much wider influence. This new managerial dimen-
sion of human accountability, we argue, combined with the
existing technological and other economic factors that had al-
ready made Britain the wealthiest industrial country in the
world, now enabled the new managers of U.S. business rapidly
to overtake the U.K. in economic power during the 19th cen-
tury, albeit starting from a negligible base.
E) In the business context, the distinguishing features of this
new human accountability included, on the accounting dimen-
sion, the development of standards of work performance as a
basis for fixing piece rates and wages, thereby providing at the
shopfloor level both discipline and economic incentive to the
work force to internalize business goals so as to begin to be-
come governable persons [Miller and O’Leary, 1987]. At higher
levels of management, a comparable, increasing emphasis on
performance measurement reflected alignment with top
management’s emphasis on return on investment, linking the
accountability and incentives of top management through fi-
nancial accounting to owners’ returns. On the organizational
23
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dimension, a new emphasis on formal structures, which in the
U.S. culminated in the divisional or “M-form” organization of
profit centers, was reflected in linkages between accounting
and organization, and between strategy and structure.
F) While the U.K. in many ways retained its distinctive man-
agement culture, it has always been fascinated by U.S. develop-
ments and been eager to import at least aspects of American
innovation. Today, the American model of calculative, manage-
rial enterprise dominates. This is not to argue for the “Ambrit”
fallacy criticized by Littler [1982, p. 50] and others [Boyns and
Edwards, 1996, p. 47]. As already argued, U.K. and U.S. ac-
counting and management practice developed in different ways
in the 19th and early 20th centuries. However, there was gradu-
ally increasing interchange, through the emergence of U.S. cost
accounting literature and scientific management at the end of
the 19th century [Fleischman, 2000]; through various British
governmental and other official attempts to investigate what
was held out as being American best practice; and, in the 20th
century, through U.K. chartered accountants “learning Ameri-
can cost-accounting principles and procedures,” whether as in-
dividuals working for American-owned firms [Matthews et al.,
1998, p. 210] or by officially visiting the U.S. to learn about
management accounting itself [Anglo-American Council on
Productivity, 1950, cited by Boyns and Edwards, 1996, p. 46].
G)  The combination of these factors suggests the need for a
wide-ranging, theoretical and historical research agenda which
covers developments in both management and financial ac-
counting and links them to wider structural changes in busi-
ness, business education, and beyond [Gwilliam et al., 1992].
However, it may be that only some of the above propositions
can survive detailed examination of the historical evidence. Al-
most the whole chain of linkages would be shattered if certain
key links were destroyed. From the perspective of accounting,
the key links are clearly D and E. So here is where we have
focused the majority of our research to date. Given the critiques
that have been made of it already, as analyzed in the next two
sections, we need to be careful to spell out exactly what we are
saying at these points. We shall refer to them further in ad-
dressing the specific criticisms that have been made.
BOYNS AND EDWARDS
From a wide range of detailed conceptual and archival
24
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss1/5
115Hoskin and Macve: Knowing More As Knowing Less
work by Boyns and Edwards and their collaborators on BIR
and French firms’ accounting, we focus here on two recent pa-
pers and one book which have directly or indirectly challenged
our own interpretation of the development of modern cost and
management accounting. Below we briefly summarize the au-
thors’ main arguments, with our own comments thereon pre-
sented within double bold brackets.
Boyns and Edwards [1996]:
• U.K. and U.S. accounting in the mid-19th century must be
seen as having developed in significantly different ways. [[We
agree, as this is an essential element of our own thesis. See B
and F above.]]
• Chandler’s history of the growth of multi-unit business en-
terprises (MBEs) in the U.S. focuses on the new function of
administrative coordination and allocation, the visible hand re-
placing the invisible hand of Adam Smith’s competitive market
economy. It is primarily concerned with higher levels of man-
agement coordination (departmental headquarters, central of-
fice, general office), not with control over the shopfloor, the
focus of later scientific management and Taylorism where our
own work on Springfield is located. [[We agree; see D and E
above. But, as we have argued in D above, Springfield repre-
sents a crucial first stage. While Boyns and Edwards themselves
accept the conclusions of our work on the link between West
Point and Springfield,31  Tyson [1990] has argued against there
being any significant West Point influence on the developments
at Springfield. Consequently, we have had to develop our argu-
ments on the nature of the changes in shopfloor discipline there
in considerable detail [Hoskin and Macve, 1994a]. Moreover, it
is clearly important to our defending the significance of the
West Point link to Springfield that we do not find similar devel-
opments elsewhere in the U.S. before then and that we do not
find similar developments in the U.K. until much later. The
necessary juxtaposition of the conditions of possibility for such
a transformation in human accountability may have occurred
elsewhere independently, but the only evidence and theoretical
explanation that we have at present is uniquely American, so
that the transmission to the U.K. (see F above) and elsewhere
occurred much later. Testing this thesis has been a large part of
31They do not accept the significance of our link between West Point and
certain railroads.
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the motivation for the papers on the Waltham-Lowell mills in
the U.S. [Hoskin and Macve, 1996] and on Boulton & Watt and
the Northeast coal mines in the U.K. (Fleischman et al., 1995;
Fleischman and Macve, 2000). Nevertheless, we agree that the
more important arena is that of higher levels of management in
MBEs, and we are currently focusing our work on the U.S.
railroads, developing the arguments previously put forward in
Hoskin and Macve [1988, 1994b] as to the significance of the
West Point link to the railroads and thence to the mid and late
19th century U.S. industrial-military complex.]] In this context,
Boyns and Edwards [1996, p. 41] noted, following Chandler,
that “information originally collected to enable efficient co-or-
dination of flows between departments was recognized as hav-
ing a potential to assess the performance of managers” but
warned that “its usefulness and efficiency in this respect is an
issue which has received little detailed examination by histori-
ans.” [[This debate is at the heart of our own enquiry into the
history of the present (C above), a present which is character-
ized by the proliferation of performance indicators [Power,
1997].]]
• Boyns and Edwards [1996, p. 43] correspondingly argued
that our definition of managerialism focuses exclusively on
“control of the workforce,” contrasting Aucoin’s wider defini-
tion:
Managerialism, in contrast to the traditional bureau-
cratic ideal of ‘administration’, . . . emerged in the pri-
vate sector, . . . [because of] an increased concern with
‘results’, ‘performance’ and ‘outcomes’. Hence higher
priority is given to the ‘management’ of people, re-
sources and programmes compared to the ‘administra-
tion’ of activities, procedures and regulations.
[[We disagree with Boyns and Edwards’ interpretation of our
position for the reasons already given and because Aucoin’s
definition essentially matches our own.32  The important differ-
ence of insight lies in our focus on how this managerialism is
exercised “grammatocentrically” through “writing, examining
and grading,” as a “positive system of power which deploys the
feedback of expert knowledge to identify weakness and engi-
neer improvement” [Boyns and Edwards, 1996, p. 42]. We have
32“Management refers to the effective co-ordination of both ‘men and
matériel’ (to use the military term)” [Hoskin and Macve, 1994a, p. 18].
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set this argument out more fully in Hoskin and Macve, 1990.]]
Boyns and Edwards [1996, p. 44] therefore asserted that our
“narrow focus” on “human accountability” [e.g., in Hoskin and
Macve, 1994a; Fleischman et al., 1995], in particular on estab-
lishing “the precise sequence of development that led to the
widespread adoption of standards for measuring human per-
formance that are the basis of modern managerial control,”
puts us at risk of “missing, or ignoring, significant develop-
ments and, possibly, discontinuities in accounting over the last
two centuries.” [[For the reasons already given, we reject this
characterization of our overall framework and research agenda.
We have explained above why we have given priority in much
of our work to date to the issue of standards of work per-
formance. However, our actual archival research, in order to
emphasize what we see as distinctive, has necessarily had to
look also at the related developments in other aspects of man-
agement and management accounting in the enterprises we
have surveyed. Where we differ in substance from Boyns and
Edwards and other economic rationalist accounting historians
is in how we interpret the relative significance of those different
kinds of changes in practice. The theoretical, evidential, and
historiographical reasons that form our own interpretation, as
in D and E above, have been previously discussed.]]
• Boyns and Edwards then proceeded to the heart of their
paper and examined the Dowlais ironworks in the mid-19th
century “to assess whether or not they used their system for
achieving human accountability or for other purposes,” essen-
tially as we ourselves might have done. The conclusions they
drew from the evidence, that the accounting system was not
used for labor control in the 1850s, are, however, very different.
They considered that we would regard this “lack of concern
with labour discipline and performativity to represent entrepre-
neurial failure,” while they would regard it as a rational deci-
sion by Dowlais management given the likely costs and benefits
of attempting to add this kind of accounting control to their
existing structure for work-force contracting and discipline, un-
der the prevailing conditions in the labor market. This same
argument was essentially used by Tyson [1990] with regard to
the Springfield Armory work force in the 1830s [Hoskin and
Macve, 1994a]. [[To this our response would be, there was no
entrepreneurial failure; rather, the conditions of possibility
which enabled the introduction of the new human discipline in
the U.S., particularly the West Point influence, were not yet
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manifest in the U.K. as they had not yet been in the U.S. at
Springfield under Lee’s superintendency:
To come to treat human performance like that of a
machine, functioning as if it is observable, measurable
and controllable in terms of efficiency, is to create a
new discourse and a new way of seeing, describing and
controlling the world [Fleischman et al., 1995, p. 174,
cited by Boyns and Edwards, 1996, p. 44].
Boyns and Edwards (similar to Tyson [1990] mutatis
mutandis) saw sufficient explanation for the lack of an account-
ing focus on human performance in the economic conditions at
Dowlais at the time. But to convince their skeptics, they would
need to identify what change in costs and/or benefits would
have been sufficient to make the change worthwhile. There is
certainly no doubt that Dowlais, like other 19th century con-
cerns, would have benefited from an improvement in labor dis-
cipline to minimize the cost disadvantages of downtime of ex-
pensive capital facilities [Boyns and Edwards, 1996, pp. 51-53],
especially under Clark’s strategy of increasing output to reduce
unit costs (see our discussion of Boyns and Edwards [1997a]
below). As Boyns and Edwards argued, the nature of 19th cen-
tury labor contracts, in particular the ways in which internal
contracting could substitute for accounting for and control over
individual workers’ labor costs, is an area where detailed
knowledge is still largely lacking. Nevertheless, if one always
assumes that accounting changes are an optimal response to
changing costs and benefits, it is trivially true to conclude that
any particular accounting configuration must have represented
a rational trade off of the costs and benefits as currently per-
ceived [Boyns and Edwards, 1996, p. 55]. We accept the tautol-
ogy, but we believe it has potential empirical content because
we have an historical theory of what it was that was missing
from the perceptions of the Dowlais managers. They were
trapped in the premodern discourse that could not yet see hu-
man performance in the same scientific terms as machine per-
formance (see propositions D and E above).]] From Boyns and
Edwards’ own perspective, of course, what is more significant
about Dowlais is the different way in which the accounting
system came to be used following the change in top manage-
ment in 1855. As this is also the substance of their 1997a paper,
we will discuss it under that heading.
Boyns and Edwards [1997a]: This paper was not structured pri-
marily as a critique of our own position, although the introduc-
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tory and concluding sections repeated the observations that the
work of “Foucauldian writers” such as ourselves “has given par-
ticular weight to the specific developments at the Springfield
Armory in the 1830s;” that “there often appears to be an im-
plicit assumption” that “developments in Britain were . . . iden-
tical, either in form or timing, to those in America;” and that
“Foucauldians” have attributed the development of manage-
ment accounting “to the need for managers of corporations to
control and discipline labour by rendering their actions visible
and calculable. . . . ‘managing by the numbers’ ” (pp. 19-21).
[[As already stated, we reject these interpretations of our posi-
tion. See A, B, E, and F above.]]
A more important target was Chandler. “It is directly im-
plied in his work that the direction of causation runs from
strategy, through structure to accounting,” although it is noted
that Johnson and Kaplan suggested the reverse causation and
“that developments in management accounting, rather than
having been a consequence of the emergence of large-scale
businesses, ‘may have facilitated the growth of large scale
firms’ ” (p. 20). Boyns and Edwards’ own conclusion was that,
“the link is more complex, possibly reflecting . . . a symbiotic
rather than causal relationship” (p. 41). [[We would agree. The
relationship between strategy and structure in the new 19th
century managerial U.S. railroad corporations reflects the im-
pact of the West Point graduates on both [Hoskin et al., 1998].]]
Boyns and Edwards were concerned to settle the definition
of management accounting, where they adopted the ICAEW’s
1954 definition, “any form of accounting which enables busi-
ness to be conducted more efficiently” (p. 22). [[For the reasons
given at A above, we have no quarrel with this as a working
definition, as we do not believe our theoretical and historical
differences of substance relate to the definition of management
accounting, but to what have actually been its most significant
developments in the 19th and 20th centuries. However, we
would repeat our view that management accounting is more
than just business statistics.]]
The substance of Boyns and Edwards’ paper plots the
changes at Dowlais, one of the largest industrial enterprises of
the mid-19th century and a forerunner of today’s GKN plc,
where, following the death of Sir Josiah John Guest, direct
management responsibility passed in 1855 to G.T. Clark. Clark
was accountable solely to the trustees of the Guest family es-
tate, the family now becoming absentee owners. Clark revived
Dowlais’ fortunes dramatically by a strategy of which the major
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elements were (1) ensuring full use of capacity to reduce unit
costs; (2) successfully gambling on technological advance by
being the first manufacturer to adopt the new Bessemer con-
verter to move into more profitable steel production; (3) inten-
sifying the coal-mining activity to secure adequate supplies for
his enlarged furnaces, thereby also diversifying into a new
product for sale; and (4) abandoning the policy of the London
House of maintaining high prices for the sale of final output.
Boyns and Edwards saw the changes in management struc-
ture as less extensive than had been previously argued by other
economic and business historians, but they did see Clark pay-
ing much more attention to the implications of the cost ac-
counting figures in relation to adopting and monitoring his
high output strategy and to identifying the cost savings and
other benefits from diversifying. His new general manager, Wil-
liam Menelaus, was routinely requiring “from each department
weekly reports on a few centrally-determined strategic statis-
tics, such as output, costs and hours, and giving similar sum-
maries to Clark” (p. 29). The new accountant, William Jenkins,
was able, as he put it, gradually to “alter the system in the large
accounts of this place” so that “the transactions of the Com-
pany in the Books here are I think becoming more clear and
simple.” He began in 1860 providing Clark with annual reports,
supported by many pages of detailed analysis (p. 32). The un-
derlying cost accounting routines, however, may not have
changed very much. The cost sheets, of which the surviving
examples are all from before 1855, showed “the following three
fundamental features . . . : the company used, as far as possible,
transfer prices that exactly recovered costs incurred; the ac-
counting method used was total (absorption) costing; and, con-
sequently, profit recognition was delayed until products were
sold to the customer.” By 1851, the cost sheets reflected: “fig-
ures in terms of cost and quantity for inputs and outputs on a
total and per ton basis” and “inputs per ton of output expressed
in terms of cost and quantity.”33  It is also known that “the
information was extracted from the books of accounts kept at
Dowlais and that these were kept on the double entry basis”
(pp. 33-34).
Boyns and Edwards summarized the use of this informa-
tion: “Whilst some evidence exists, therefore, of the use of cost
information by the Dowlais management prior to the Clark era
33Similar information can be found in the “view-books” of Northeast coal
mines in the BIR [Fleischman and Macve, 2000].
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of control, it is not very strong and does not suggest any major
role for the accounting/costing system in management decision-
making. This situation was to change, however, when Clark
assumed control” (p. 36).
Clark’s response to the crisis he inherited was to undertake
extensive capital expenditure to refurbish the plant in order to
increase output and thereby reduce the cost of manufacture.
Improvement in profitability soon followed. For 1855-1856, the
accounting records had shown that the cost per ton of finished
iron had risen to nearly £7. 18s. 1.6d, while the selling prices
had declined below that cost by an average of more than 18
shillings per ton (p. 36). But in 1857, Menelaus prepared a
series of ad hoc reports for Clark based on figures supplied by
Jenkins and others demonstrating (1) the difference in yield
(i.e., improvement in output per ton of coal used and the conse-
quential cost saving of £28,000 per annum) achieved, in part,
through weekly monitoring of each furnace’s output as changes
in manufacturing methods were tried and through comparison
of yield figures with those of local competitors; (2) the improve-
ment in efficiency of use of other inputs from trying different
input combinations, measured per ton of iron produced, and
the consequential cost saving of £7,800. 14s. 8d per annum; and
(3) comparisons to show the falling total cost per ton of output,
although the computation of total cost was complicated by
some of the £23,643 cost of capital improvements having been
charged as current costs. There are also calculations of the
implications of now needing both to build the country’s most
powerful mill to exploit the potential for increased production
capacity and also to increase coal production.
By 1859, there are calculations by Menelaus of the benefit
of paying the asking price of £50,000 for another ironworks in
order to obtain cost savings on coal by exploiting its mining
lease and by substituting small for large coal, to secure coal
supplies, and also to obtain the benefits of diversifying into the
sale of coal. Boyns and Edwards summarized, “The specialist
reports made heavy use of costing information as a basis for
assessing the effect of previous decisions and as a prominent
input in formulating new plans. We also imagine that routine
data was used on a day to day basis by middle management to
identify inefficiency and waste, though insufficient material has
survived to prove conclusively that this was the case. We know,
however, that cost and yield analysis featured prominently in
the annual reports prepared by Jenkins for Clark. . . . ” (pp. 40-
41).
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Their conclusions to the paper were that the use of ac-
counting information at Dowlais developed in an evolutionary
fashion from existing systems in order to meet changing man-
agement needs, so that the relationship between strategy, struc-
ture, and accounting change is more complex than Chandler
had proposed. Clark introduced a clear, new strategy, sup-
ported by costing and other production data. Although there
were some top management changes, Dowlais was already, and
remained, a multi-unit business with distinct departments.
While the use of accounting information intensified, there was
no marked change in the system itself.
Pointing out that there is no evidence of the use of the
costing system “directly to monitor and control the perform-
ance of individual workers, be they unskilled labourers . . . or
the managers of different departments” (p. 42), Boyns and
Edwards again argued that this suggests “fundamental differ-
ences between the British and American approaches to man-
agement accounting” and called for “comparative research”
which “could yield some important findings for contemporary
debates” (p. 43). [[As already noted, exploration of such differ-
ences underlies some of our own work [e.g., Fleischman et al.,
1995; Fleischman and Macve, 2000].
As to the central issues, Boyns and Edwards clearly
handled the evidential issues very carefully. Whether one
adopts the perspective of our work, that of their other studies
[e.g., Boyns and Edwards, 1997b], or that of others [e.g.,
Fleischman and Parker, 1992, 1997], their major conclusions
about the changes at Dowlais fit well with the general picture of
U.K. management accounting developments around this time.
They also fit with our main thesis as to the different pace of
developments in the U.S. and U.K. (see B and F above). In
generalizing from Dowlais to modern issues, one would, how-
ever, need to take into account some significant factors about
Dowlais as Boyns and Edwards describe it. It was still a private
company, and Clark himself observed that he would not have
been able to persuade a meeting of stockholders in a limited
company to endorse his strategy. While the operations were
divided between departments with middle managers, Clark’s
own dominance was total and “despotic” (p. 41), quite contrary
to that now prescribed by codes of corporate governance. Al-
though a manager himself, he appeared to share the entrepre-
neur/owner’s outlook as expressed by his neighboring
ironmaster, William Crawshay II, who wrote to his son in 1860
[as quoted by Pollard, 1965, p. 22]:
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I know what the Master’s Eye is—nothing can go long
without it and I dread the consequences of your longer
continued inability to personally look after the large
concern at Cyfarthfa.34
As to the historical insights from identifying Clark’s use of
the costing information in support of his strategy to rescue
Dowlais and secure its long-term survival, the main plank of the
strategy did not really require any more sophisticated analysis
than that greater volume of output reduces unit costs. Precisely
what those costs were was less important, as illustrated by the
accounting treatment of new work and consequently of depre-
ciation. There was also plenty of mileage in the direct cost sav-
ings from the more efficient use of cheaper coal and other raw
material inputs. Complex profitability calculations of price and
volume do not seem to have been undertaken. Clark’s faith in
cutting prices was not shared by the London House agent re-
sponsible for sales (p. 28):
we have never yet arrived at an understanding of the
comparative loss of ‘reduced make’ and ‘full make at
losing prices’. The result of the latter are those which
are more prominent here to our eyes—the former to
yours—and I can well understand the difficulty of com-
parison is great.35
Clark’s own remuneration was incentive-compatible with
his chosen strategy [Gietzmann, 1995]. In 1858, he proposed, in
addition to his salary, a commission based on sales above
60,000 tons of iron per year (p. 27).
Finally, the observation that use of cost accounting infor-
mation is intensified during crises, or when owners/managers
suddenly discover a need to get control and find out what is
going on, is paralleled in earlier examples such as Wedgwood’s
pottery [McKendrick, 1970] and Boulton and Watt’s Soho
Foundry [Fleischman et al., 1995]. It is not always clear how
intensively the information continued to be used after the crisis
34Dufaud reported in 1823 that at Cyfarthfa, “all costs are known,” but this
was the result, not of “extensive costing systems but via subcontracting rates
established between the mine owners and entrepreneurs in the mines who
hired their own labour on the basis of independently determined wage con-
tracts” [Bhimani, 1998b, fn. 4]. Further discussion of such internal contracting
appears below.
35At this period on the U.S. railroads, such comparative calculations were
commonplace and a particular feature of Haupt’s strategic thinking on the
PRR [Hoskin and Macve, 1994b].
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had passed, and how far one can generalize to the likely routine
use of such information by other industrial concerns.36
At the routine level, as Boyns and Edwards [1996, p. 48]
put it, Dowlais’ multi-unit structure meant that it “had a need
for administrative co-ordination and to keep the production in
the various departments ‘in balance.’ ” As we see it, much of
this need would presumably have been met by physical rather
than monetary accounting measures.37  Clearly routine account-
ing records have many actual and potential uses (our proposi-
tion A above), and it is interesting to have these various uses at
different times and in differing circumstances illustrated. How-
ever, we would still argue that the development that gave them
their most powerful, continuous, modern role, going way be-
yond that of statistics or simply organizational routine, was the
development of what we have called human accountability
within a defined organizational structure. The negative evi-
dence from Dowlais set out by Boyns and Edwards in respect of
human accountability and labor control confirms our own
work on other U.K. enterprises, and on U.S. enterprises before
the Springfield Armory episode.]]
Boyns, Edwards, and Nikitin [1997a]: This valuable study [see
also Boyns et al., 1997b] charted developments in France and
Britain, and illustrated (p. 18) the now generally well-accepted
thesis that French 19th century accounting texts were ahead of
French practice. By contrast, U.K. accounting practice was of-
ten well ahead of accounting texts, which only began to appear
towards the end of the century [Boyns and Edwards, 1997b].
Clearly, from our own perspective, research on accounting de-
velopments in France is of particular interest, given the devel-
opment of the pedagogic regime at West Point from French
models.38  There is not space here to discuss all the issues that
the authors raised in examining the possible reasons for this
36As Loft [1995, p. 22] recounted from an interviewee who had been a cost
accountant between the two World Wars: “If the business was making a profit
they weren’t concerned with all my records…in my time, I gathered a lot of
statistics which have never been used.”
37See also Payne [1988, p. 32] re Cyfarthfa in 1825, citing Jones [1985, p.
136].
38For a history of Gribeauval’s experiment with interchangeable-part
manufacture of French artillery, see Alder [1997]. The potential links to Eu-
rope go deeper given the Prussian development of professional examinations
for military officers from 1808, reflecting the existing university-based training
of civil officials [Hoskin et al., 1998].
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differential development. We simply note that, in their intro-
ductory chapter, the authors complained that “Foucauldian ac-
counting historians believe that their methodological approach
is broader than that followed by other accounting historians,
and are particularly critical of what they call ‘traditional’ ac-
counting history.” The authors went on to state that, while they
themselves adopt an essentially economic rationalist approach,
they are nevertheless “willing to acknowledge the potential in-
fluence of other factors, including the socio-political and his-
torical contexts of a period” (p. 6). In their concluding chapter,
they repeated their criticism of our focus on “shopfloor labour”
and the Springfield Armory as an “incomplete” analysis of man-
agement accounting’s development (pp. 180-181). [[We have re-
butted this criticism above. Here we do no more than note
Bhimani’s [1998a, p. 397] surprise, in his review of this book, at
the authors’ summary dismissal of the Foucauldian approach.]]
Boyns et al. do, however, confirm that they had found no posi-
tive evidence in Britain or France of accounting before 1880
being used principally to control labor (p. 181).39
TYSON
We have previously responded [Hoskin and Macve, 1994a]
to Tyson’s [1990] critique of our work on the Springfield Ar-
mory, where he received support from Boyns and Edwards
[1996, p. 43], so we do not repeat our arguments here. We have
also challenged Tyson’s [1992] conclusions concerning the use
of cost information at the Waltham-Lowell mills [Hoskin and
Macve, 1996], but Tyson [1998] has now restated his own case,
and it is to this paper that we now briefly reply.
Tyson [1998]: At the Lawrence Manufacturing Co. in the 1840s,
the costings included six-month schedules, integrated with the
double-entry ledgers, analyzing profits and costs by each of five
mills for nine individual varieties of cloth. The main thesis of
our 1996 paper was the contention that the sophistication of
these Waltham-Lowell companies’ cost analyses, and the extent
of their use for management purposes, had been overstated by
previous researchers. The accounts had been taken as evidence
that a modern managerial approach was already being adopted
in manufacturing contexts for the purpose of developing a re-
39Further research is needed on Decazeville [cf. Hoskin and Macve, 1988,
p. 64].
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gime of cost control and performativity within the factory. We
suggested that they have a different explanation, as calculations
made for classic mercantile purposes to track flows of money
spent and received in manufacturing. Their arithmetical preci-
sion reflected the conditions under which the calculations had
to be carried out and verified rather than their economic sig-
nificance. It is important for accounting historians to allow
modern intent in such accounting only after the most stringent
scrutiny of the evidence.
Tyson [1998] responded in three main ways:
• Our narrow interpretation of managerialism and manage-
ment accounting is focused on the development of labor stand-
ard costs and variances, ignoring other important managerial
functions and corresponding uses of accounting information.
[[We have dealt with this argument, which we consider to be a
basic misunderstanding of our position, above in relation to
Boyns and Edwards’ criticisms (see also our propositions A and
E above). Anyway, it is irrelevant to the thesis in our 1996
paper that there is no evidence of the supposed other uses of the
information by the mill owners/managers.]]
• We “wrongly imply that decision making based on subop-
timal information cannot be perceived as rational,” although
this line of argument is only “suggested but largely undeveloped
in the current [i.e., Tyson’s] paper” (p. 212). [[Although it is not
developed further, we have discussed this issue from a theoreti-
cal perspective above. One of the major motivations for our
own work has been to try to understand how such “inherently
problematical” information [Ezzamel et al., 1990] has come to
play such a powerful role in modern corporate life.]]
• Tyson’s primary argument was that evidence from outside
the accounting records themselves does in fact demonstrate
that Waltham-Lowell owners/managers were using their ac-
counts in “a variety of decision-making, management control
and problem-solving scenarios” (pp. 211-212). [[The production
of such evidence would indeed refute our 1996 arguments
where we adduced evidence [from Lubar, 1984] that the mill
agent at Lawrence, for example, did not regard the costings as
of any great significance beyond demonstrating a full and hon-
est accounting for monies received and spent:
expenses are not easily distributed with entire accu-
racy, nor is it of much importance whether it is so or
not, so long as it can be fully documented that the
36
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funds have been faithfully applied and correctly ac-
counted for.
Tyson [1998] did not comment on this first-hand observation.
Neither did he adduce any substantial evidence of the use of the
costing figures for management decision making and control.40
Tyson cited a number of secondary opinions, but when he
turned to the primary sources, rightly looking for evidence “be-
yond the ledger,” the best he could come up with was (1) an ad
hoc report at Merrimack Manufacturing Co. which, if anything,
suggested that the apparent cost should be ignored in making
the most economically favorable decision (p. 217 and fn. 15),
and (2) a surmise that “it is not unreasonable to assume that
Nathan Appleton read the cost reports he received regu-
larly . . . ” (p. 217). See our comments on evidence above.
To be fair, Tyson admitted (p. 218) in relation to the de-
tailed information about mill and product costs that, “it is un-
clear whether or how it was used in deciding which mill should
manufacture particular grades of cloth” (spare capacity may
have been the decisive factor) and “unfortunately, the available
evidence does not permit a more precise conclusion about the
actual use of cost information” although “it can also be argued
that summary reports[41 ] contain information that, when ex-
tracted, could be used for production control” (our emphasis
added). While Tyson unsurprisingly was able to find correspon-
dence and minutes in the archive which exhibited awareness of
considerations of quantity and cost on the part of mill owners/
managers in making decisions, he adduced no primary evidence
of the costs reported in the formal accounting system being
directly utilized for any such management purpose, however
widely defined. He merely repeated the assertions and conclu-
40While Tyson quoted (p. 215), from Lubar’s Ph.D. thesis [1983, p. 150],
Lubar’s own opinion as: “Cost accounting enabled managers and owners to
communicate the results of the mill operations. It allowed them to evaluate
technologies, to assess the productivity of employees, and, more generally, to
establish and maintain control over the operations of the mill,” Tyson was left
speculating over the paradox that Lubar appeared to be describing a so-called
“Hoskin and Macve” type managerialism when there is actually no evidence of
accounting for labor discipline at the Lawrence mills (p. 215). When it comes
to secondary opinions rather than primary sources, we would place more
weight on a refereed article such as Lubar [1984] than on a dissertation.
41We do not understand why Tyson [1998, pp. 218-219) appeared to argue
that we ignored the six-monthly “Analysis of the Profits,” when this was the
major focus of both Porter’s [1980] and our 1996 paper. However, Tyson again
only conjectured potential uses of the information therein.
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sions of other historians who probably failed to understand the
reasons for which such cost analyses evolved out of traditional
mercantile records.]]
VERSIONS OF THE NEW ACCOUNTING HISTORY
Boyns and Edwards [1997b, p. 7] have commented: “In her
otherwise admirable survey of the different methodological ap-
proaches—traditional, neo-classicist, Johnson and Kaplan,
labour process and Foucauldian—Loft (1995) does not attempt
to present a new, consensual view of the development of ac-
counting.” We ought therefore ourselves to review in detail the
growing number of recent overviews of accounting history re-
search in an attempt both to indicate where we believe our
approach complements those of other accounting historians,
and where substantive differences remain. A fuller version of
that project must await another paper as, at this meta-level of
critique, the various overviews do not directly criticize our own
approach, although clearly such criticism is often a logical im-
plication of the views expressed [e.g., Oldroyd, 1999]. We there-
fore restrict ourselves here to an abbreviated, nonspecific “re-
view of reviews” of accounting history research. We identify
three common themes in these reviews:
• While there is often polemic between “traditional” and
“new” history, and between differing degrees of “critical” his-
tory (but also collaboration; e.g., Fleischman et al., 1995), the
new conventional wisdom is that plurality of conceptual per-
spectives, research questions, and methodologies is now to be
regarded as a sign, not of intellectual weakness, but rather of
both the maturity of accounting history and of its consonance
with the state of social science research and wider historical
research. Hence Boyns and Edwards should not be surprised
[cf. 1997b, p. 7] that “Loft (1995) does not attempt to present a
new consensual view of the development of accounting.” An
exception is labor process and Marxist critical history which
has a singular, clear, and exclusive, albeit monochromatic, view
of the main driver of capitalistic development and of
accounting’s role as its accomplice.
• The “new” history frequently focuses on individual, appar-
ently unconnected incidents in which changes in accounting, or
new accountings, emerge in order to explore the discursive and
institutional factors that underlay the “event,” to reveal the “en-
semble” of techniques and practices that constitute new forms
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of social and economic calculation, and to demonstrate the his-
torical contingency of what is called, or operates as, accounting
at different times and in different places, including the present.
• While new historians respect the archive, rightly arguing
its extension beyond traditional ledgers and accounting texts,
their particular interest in theoretical interpretation has so far
meant that much of the new history has primarily comprised
reinterpretation of existing histories and other secondary
sources rather than revisiting the primary archive to examine
whether it will bear the weight of the new interpretations.
In relation to these three themes, we ourselves neverthe-
less adopt historico-theoretical positions which in several re-
spects are closer to those of “traditional” historians [e.g.,
Fleischman et al., 1996; Oldroyd, 1999]:
• First, we approach our own study of accounting history
from a unifying perspective of seeking to understand the rela-
tionships between accounting change and a theorization of eco-
nomic and social change from antiquity to the present day. We
focus in particular on forms and modes of writing and calcula-
tion, and on how, through their interplay with certain other
practices (particularly pedagogic ones), they engender new
modes of discourse and new institutional forms, thus constitut-
ing particular kinds of power-knowledge interrelation. We build
on the work of Michel Foucault, but, given his own ignorance
of accounting and his other historical misunderstandings, have
developed our own theoretical view [Hoskin and Macve, 1993;
Hoskin, 1993, 1994]. Clearly such a view stands in contradic-
tion to other “unitary” views of accounting history, be they
“capitalistic”/economic rationalist or “labor process”/Marxist.42
• Second, we believe that in any significant interpretive his-
tory of an accounting event, there should be an implicit, if not
explicit, attempt to understand its relationship to events at
other times and in other places, a hypothesis at least of how it
might fit into a broader conception of the history of account-
ing.43 Without such a conceptual grounding, there is no way of
identifying what might or might not be a significant event in
42We have countered the criticisms made of us by the former school above.
We shall deal with the latter in a further paper, although we comment on the
inadequacy of its interpretation of changes in labor practices at the Waltham
Watch Company in our concluding coda below.
43Although we ourselves have such a substantive conception, we consider
that this second requirement holds even if the researcher’s theory is that there
can be no such broader conception [e.g., Oldroyd, 1999].
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the sense, for example, that it illustrates the coming together of
significant linkages between discourses, practices, and institu-
tions. Implicit in our own approach to understanding what
have been the significant discontinuities in the history of ac-
counting is a parallel conception of what have been the conti-
nuities.
• Third, there must be a primacy of respect for the evi-
dence.44 While the evidence may often be inconclusive, and
while it may be that many interpretations are plausible, never-
theless historical rigor demands that new interpretations dem-
onstrate that they are at least not incompatible with the surviv-
ing, primary evidence. Also, proponants of new interpretation
should have made the effort, in the spirit of Popper and scien-
tific “falsification,” to uncover and investigate sources of evi-
dence that might have the potential to discredit them.
Our larger project is therefore to write, or at least to con-
tribute, to a “new” history of accounting.45  We have begun by
seeking to identify the major discontinuities in that history that
claim priority on our attention. As we have argued above, our
work on the 19th century is not only or even primarily a “gene-
alogy” of the Springfield Armory event [cf. Miller and Napier,
1993]. At the same time, if we have interpreted that event
wrongly in the sense that there is no discontinuity discoverable
there, the rest of the endeavor would probably be built on sand.
However, if we have interpreted it correctly, and there is a ge-
nealogical link from West Point both to Springfield Armory
production and to multi-unit management on the railroads,
then our continuing genealogical task is to trace out how the
increasingly complex networks of change agents extended from
those sites into different spheres.
CONCLUSION
What then are the priorities now for accounting history
research? We would argue that tracing the networks of influ-
ence by which the new 19th century accounting transformed
individuals and organizations, first in the U.S., then in the U.K.
and Europe, and now globally, still requires much work to
build a coherent picture out of the pieces of the jigsaw. We have
44As we have previously affirmed in Hoskin and Macve [1994a, pp. 22-23].
45The late 18th century and 19th century period will be the subject matter
of Hoskin and Macve [2000]. Here we shall challenge Levenstein’s [1998] re-
cent revision and extension of the Chandlerian thesis.
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reviewed here a number of the negative findings from BIR his-
tory and early 19th century U.S. history. We need more positive
findings from U.S. history in the later 19th century and early
20th century. So we conclude with a coda, an example of how
the extension of the network of the newly significant discursive
practices might be traced. It is only a tentative example, as we
have not ourselves revisited the relevant archive, but it is sug-
gestive.
We do so, while re-echoing the calls in Fleischman et al.
[1995] and Boyns and Edwards [1996] for continuing investiga-
tion on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as in Europe and
beyond [cf. Boyns et al., 1997a, 1997b; Bhimani, 1998b], to
trace the conditions of possibility for the emergence of the key
defining characteristics of modern accounting’s power. Ac-
counting’s history must be further rewritten. While we must
discard some currently cherished knowledge along the way so
that there is a sense of loss and of “knowing less,” we hope that
thereby we and other researchers will indeed arrive at “knowing
more.”
CODA: THE WALTHAM WATCH COMPANY AS A MOMENT
IN MANAGERIALISM’S EMERGENCE
The Waltham Watch Company (WWC) has been celebrated
by U.S. historians as a major site for both managerial and tech-
nological innovation [Clawson, 1980; Hoke, 1990]. Recently,
Fleischman and Tyson [1996] have looked more closely at how
accounting may have contributed to this process. Their particu-
lar interest was stirred by the fact that the WWC, founded in
1849, still employed inside contracting (IC) up to the mid-
1870s. Given that it was both an innovative and successful en-
terprise, as the first mover and then global market leader in the
mass production of watches into the 20th century, this is an
intriguing finding. IC has frequently been seen as a premodern
form of organization. From an economic rationalist point of
view, it has been seen as less efficient for managing large, com-
plex businesses than full-blown, bureaucratic, managerial con-
trol, supported by cost and management accounting systems
[Chandler, 1977; Johnson and Kaplan, 1987], and as maintain-
ing a “producer ethos” inadequate to meet the forces of compe-
tition and insufficiently responsive to consumer choice
[Fleischman and Tyson, 1996, p. 64]. From a labor process per-
spective [Braverman, 1974], IC has also been seen as
premodern, an interim step on the way to the full capitalist
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subjugation of mass labor within managerial hierarchies. At
WWC, however, IC appears in the context of a highly modern
technological and economic success story. Fleischman and
Tyson therefore saw this as a strong refutation of both the eco-
nomic rationalist argument as to IC’s inefficiency, and the labor
process thesis [Hopper and Armstrong, 1991] that the elimina-
tion of IC was effected primarily as means to secure the control
of labor, with accounting as its tool [Littler, 1982, p. 66], rather
than to introduce a more economically rational means of man-
aging production.46
We share much common ground here with Fleischman and
Tyson’s presentation of the operation of, and then change from,
IC at WWC. We have argued above for our own view of the
disciplinary nature of accounting control, and why we find the
economic rationalist explanation to be insufficient. We also re-
ject the labor process theory, not because more powerful con-
trol of labor was not an outcome of the elimination of IC (or
later of management based or standard costing, target costing,
ABC systems, etc.), but because the theory so preemptively nar-
rows an understanding of accounting’s significance.47  From our
disciplinary standpoint, accounting becomes a powerful knowl-
edge precisely as it begins to deliver cost and productivity
gains, as well as both work force and manager discipline, simul-
taneously. So Fleischman and Tyson concluded (p. 74) that at
WWC “the co-operation reflected in the raising and lowering of
wage rates, as well as partial operative ownership of the enter-
prise,[48 ] was more suggestive of a power nexus to attain the
46In the light of Fleischman and Tyson’s [1996] work, the relationship
between IC and accounting-based modes of managerial control requires a
more comprehensive consideration than we can give it here. Further discus-
sion with regard to 18th/19th century U.K. mining practices is given in
Fleischman and Macve [2000] and to the Soho works of Boulton & Watt,
around 1800-1802, in Fleischman et al. [1995].
47Karl Marx demonstrated, from his own observations of factory condi-
tions in early 19th century England, how capitalist owner/managers sought to
extract more surplus value from labor through stratagems such as lengthening
the working day (“absolute surplus value”) or intensifying the rate of work
(“relative surplus value”) [Macve, 1999, p. 596]. This did not, as such, require
any use of sophisticated accounting practices, although accounting systems
could be deployed to facilitate such “sweating” once organizations became
much larger and individual workers became less directly observable to “the
Master’s eye.” But accounting could facilitate other modes of efficient manage-
rial coordination and control equally as well.
48In 1871, over 40% of the work force were shareholders [Fleischman and
Tyson, 1996, p. 69].
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common good [the firm’s wellbeing] than the labour process
vision of single-purpose exploitation.”
Fleischman and Tyson’s analysis of WWC also suggests that
the presence of IC as such was not such a significant feature in
defining the absence or presence of managerial control. Corre-
spondingly, its abolition did not signify a significant intensifica-
tion of managerial control, and in particular of accounting, for
whatever purpose. They cited (p. 73) Englander’s [1987, p. 445]
comments “about the uniqueness of company or industry fac-
tors,” so that each case needs to be examined in context. To
clarify that, however, we suggest that what is perhaps required
is a closer differentiation between modes of inside contracting,
noting that such quasi-market-based forms of control and coor-
dination as ROI and contracting out, nowadays called
outsourcing, are clearly compatible with the modern manage-
rial regime, as well as being frequently justified in transaction
cost terms.
The traditional IC model was for owners to strike a deal,
usually a labor contract with an overseer or manager, who was
then left to establish the work/reward ratio and the level of
potential personal profit in negotiating further deals with pro-
spective workers. However, Fleischman and Tyson’s analysis of
the IC model at the WWC (p. 68) challenged the view held by
Clawson that the system was traditional in this way.49  Instead,
their interpretation of the limited evidence suggests that a very
different set of work relationships may have been in play both
while IC was in place and after its demise.
By the 1880s, when IC had been replaced and the internal
contractors had become salaried foremen, an eyewitness ac-
count by Fitch in 1883 [Fleischman and Tyson, 1996, p. 68]
describes a hierarchical control system where department fore-
men reported regularly to the superintendent:
monthly cards are prepared by the superintendent for
each foreman, stating the number and kind of watches
to be made. Each foreman makes a daily report of
work done and of the transfers of work between the
several departments, and to facilitate this each foreman
49Clawson [1980, p. 116] claimed that at WWC “the contractor of 1870 was
simply given a sum of money based on the contract price and the number of
units delivered. The contractor had complete control over this money and paid
his employees. The company had no records or formal way of knowing the
number of the contractor’s employees…or how much money the contractor
kept for himself.”
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has a bookkeeper, who is responsible to the superinten-
dent (our emphasis).
In other words, by this time at the WWC, there was a highly
disciplinary nexus. Centrally decided plans were relayed down
to each foreman, from whom daily reports were relayed back.
The production of each department and the coordination of
production overall were both open to continuous examination
and evaluation, with correction or improvement where neces-
sary. In addition, a formal objectivity was conferred on the
information generated through the separate definition of the
bookkeeper’s role as part of a staff (not a line) function. Thus,
workers, foremen, and bookkeepers would seem to have been
rendered calculable and calculating subjects of constant surveil-
lance and judgment through being brought within the interplay
of writing, examining, and grading.
But the historical question then is, when and how did this
disciplinary nexus emerge? Did it actually predate the abolition
of IC at WWC? Here Fleischman and Tyson tried to trace the
emergence of the IC model back to the early days of the com-
pany, but found (p. 68) that there is little direct evidence one
way or the other (no written inside contracts survive in the
archive) so that it is not clear how, or indeed whether, IC con-
tributed to the company’s success from the 1860s. However,
they cited indirect evidence from the reports of R.E. Robins, the
company’s treasurer.50  As early as 1862, Robins’ reports indi-
cate that “WWC executives were knowledgeable about the total
costs of IC” (although this knowledge refers to no more than
knowledge of the costs being paid to the internal contractors,
rather than how the piece rates for individual job workers were
determined). Job workers’ rates certainly do appear in the 1874-
1875 wage book, the earliest to survive, and reconcile with the
figures in the payroll book, indicating that there was an “inte-
grated record-keeping system.” Fleischman and Tyson [1996,
pp. 69-72] argued that, although the extant wage books only
date from the period in the 1870s during which the transition
from IC to direct employment was gradually being introduced,
the comparability of the “before” and “after” wage bills in the
50Robins is clearly an important figure since he had rescued the WWC,
first founded in 1849, from a financial collapse suffered in the Panic of 1857,
buying it at auction [Hoke, 1990, p. 188]. He then teamed up with the original
founders, Aaron Dennison, the so-called “Father of American Watchmaking,”
and Edward Howard, to relaunch the company.
44
Accounting Historians Journal, Vol. 27 [2000], Iss. 1, Art. 5
https://egrove.olemiss.edu/aah_journal/vol27/iss1/5
135Hoskin and Macve: Knowing More As Knowing Less
accounts suggests that “the firm knew the wages paid by the
subcontractors to the underlings before their transition to day
rates.”
The evidence available therefore remains incomplete as to
what, if any, was the impact of IC, and of its subsequent de-
mise, on the success of WWC. Fleischman and Tyson suggested
in their conclusion (p. 72) that, while the conventional “eco-
nomic efficiency” arguments and the alternative “labour proc-
ess” analysis both seem implausible for explaining what went
on at the WWC, a “Foucauldian perspective may contribute to
enrich the discussion.”51  We would agree, both in a general way
and with regard to the specifics of the WWC story. We would
suggest that their interpretation of the limited evidence for the
nature of the detailed changes in accounting and control sys-
tems for labor there can be buttressed by looking beyond the IC
process itself to locate it in what is known of the early
company’s wider technological and organizational develop-
ment. In particular, we can trace the influences of Springfield
Armory practices on both these dimensions of its development.
We suggest that these influences are far more substantial than
has been recognized, and that what they reveal is WWC re-
making itself, in a general way, as a locus of disciplinarity.
Historians of technology have already celebrated the fact
that Waltham was the first watch company to have taken up the
interchangeable-part manufacture approach, as developed at
the Springfield and Harper’s Ferry Armories [Smith, 1985], and
then to have adapted it to the very different, high-precision
demands of watch making.52  An initial debt to Springfield is
clearly acknowledged in that WWC’s cofounder, Dennison, first
had the idea of mass-producing watches when “inspired by a
51Fleischman and Tyson observed (p. 72) that “historians of the
Foucauldian persuasion have not addressed specifically the issues of IC in
early US industrialization.” We agree that further examination is necessary,
but we have examined the case of the Springfield Armory which, right from its
beginning at the start of the 19th century, had its own managed work force,
even though IC was normal for the industry and was used at Harper’s Ferry
Armory [Ezzamel et al., 1990, pp. 158, 160].
52As Hoke [1990, pp. 181-182] pointed out, this entailed adopting the
system’s key features as “a model-based system” which therefore required
“gauges made to fit the model, interchangeable parts, manufacturing to fit the
gauges,” and then adapting this to the machine production of watch parts. This
required both the design of unprecedented machines and machine tools, and a
radical redesign of gauges which could pass good parts at the required
microlevel of accuracy.
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visit to the US Armory at Springfield” [Hoke, 1990, p. 181].
However, this visit alone did not make for a successful enter-
prise since the company, as noted, went under in 1857 before
being rescued by Robins. It appears that, as with arms manu-
facture before it, the technological transformation problems
proved unanticipatedly huge and vastly expensive in both time
and money terms.53
It is at the subsequent stage of relaunch, however, that a
move to disciplinarity, largely shaped by Springfield Armory
technical and organizational practice, seems to have gathered
momentum. The historical record indicates that the company
moved impressively fast, from 1858 on, to solve its technical
problems and to become economically successful. By the early
1860s, it had achieved step increases in productivity. Whereas
in 1854, it took 21 man-days to produce one watch, by 1862 the
time was down to three days [Hoke, 1990, p. 250]. The associ-
ated savings in cost per unit were dramatic, if unrepeatable.
Subsequent to 1862, when another financial failure loomed
with the onset of the Civil War, production levels and profits
soared. The original company had produced less than 5,000
watches from 1849 to 1857, but now WWC produced 38,103
watches in 1864 and totaled over 18 million by 1910 [Hoke,
1990, p. 184].
No doubt a number of factors contributed to this turn-
around. The increasing success of the move towards automated
part-production was one. The contingent intervention of the
Civil War was another, as the market for domestically produced
watches took off with the virtual disappearance of foreign
watches.54  A third factor would seem to have been an insightful
53We have noted before [Hoskin and Macve, 1994a, p. 24, fn. 10] Smith’s
[1985, p. 86] estimate that the arms-making uniformity project involved a total
investment of over $2 million in 19th century prices, spread over 40 years
before reaching success in the 1840s. The time and dollar investment was
much less for this second-phase industry, but we note the comments of
Dennison’s partner, Edward Howard. Reflecting well after the financial col-
lapse and rebirth of WWC, he observed [Hoke, 1990, p. 189]: “When I look
back . . . I am astonished at the endurance and perseverance with which I
stuck to the task. . . . Could I have seen beforehand the trials and tribulations, I
never should have made the first movement. Millions would not tempt me to
go over the same ground.” These constitute two interesting asides on the vi-
ability of the theory that we criticized above that successful organizational
transformations are the result of the rational, comparative calculation of trans-
action costs.
54The effects of the Civil War initially included huge financial hardship,
hence a near collapse in 1862. The work force, Robins notes, agreed to forego
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application of strategic thinking given this sudden market op-
portunity. On the one hand, production seems to have been
targeted to maximize consumer choice and capture a wide
swathe of the market. A full product line was on sale by 1864,
led by the $13 Wm. Ellery grade which acquired brand value as
“the so-called Soldier’s Watch” [Hoke, 1990, p. 248].55  By 1867,
there were 24 grades of watch, basically assembled from the
same standard parts and differentiated by the quality of rela-
tively few of these, such as the jeweling, balance type, and regu-
lator type [Hoke, 1990, p. 183]. On the other hand, Robins, and
presumably the Board, evinced a strong sense of the impor-
tance of investing to maintain technological leadership, even to
the detriment of short-term dividends. In 1862 the dividend was
passed, and in 1867 it was cut back.56
Thus, by 1870, WWC had become a highly profitable and
productive company, resurrected from the ashes of a dozen
years before; a company, furthermore, which was well aware of
the joint importance of long-term thinking and short-term
effectiveness. A drive towards automation via research and in-
vestment was one priority, but this was matched by consider-
able market awareness and an effective approach to coordi-
up to 50% of their wages that year, contributing greatly to keeping the concern
going [1862 Report, cited by Fleischman and Tyson, 1996, p. 69]. At the same
time, no 1862 dividend was declared [Hoke, 1990, p. 251]. Given that in 1871
over 40% of the work force were shareholders, it is possible, if not likely, that
some in 1862 took a double hit. Subsequently, the War had beneficial effects,
not only in terms of the market opportunity it created, but also through an
inflation which helped to ease debt repayment. Striking dividend rewards en-
sued in 1864-1867.
55This strategy casts doubt on the allegation that IC systems reflect a pro-
ducer rather than a customer-oriented or marketing ethos, reflected, for ex-
ample, in Brown’s comments cited by Fleischman and Tyson [1996, p. 64].
Somewhat surprisingly, a similar allegation was still being made about WWC
in the 1880s, after the demise of IC there [see Moore’s comments cited by
Fleischman and Tyson, 1996, pp. 67-68].
56In the 1867 report, Robins notes that the Board has resolved to “vigor-
ously press the manufacture” via increased mechanization, as “the only way
open to us by which to recede the cost of manufacturing,” even should the
“result of such a course . . . be naturally to leave us temporarily without divi-
dends” [Hoke, 1990, p. 316]. In this regard, it is interesting to contrast the
belief of Clark at Dowlais in the 1850s that he would never have been able to
persuade a stockholders’ meeting of the necessity of a similar long-term strat-
egy of belt-tightening, investment, and expansion to overcome imminent disas-
ter.
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nating a low-unit-cost, high-productivity, production regime.57
WWC might therefore be seen, in the context of its time, as a
pioneer of world-class manufacturing.
The value of a disciplinary analysis, certainly in compari-
son to a labor process one at least, seems clear. Controlling the
labor process was only one factor. WWC’s success came
through the first-mover advantages it achieved and then main-
tained by the application of differing forms of disciplinary
knowledge, including engineering knowledge, financial calcula-
tion, and market-sensitive planning. It was the interplay of this
set of disciplinary practices that made this an organized entity.
At the same time, the fashioning of business opportunities
out of Springfield disciplinary practices is striking. To give just
one example, one procedure followed at Springfield was stamp-
ing a serial number on each musket, both to keep track of
issues and to facilitate the provision of appropriate replacement
parts. As early as 1858, WWC had turned this process into a
marketing opportunity, advertising replacement parts by mail
purely “by sending the serial number and describing the part”
[Hoke, 1990, p. 246]. This implies that batch production to
stock was large enough, or replacement-part production reli-
able enough, to produce any required part to order. In addition,
as Hoke [1990, p. 246] observed, it implies that “the company
had a sufficiently sophisticated record-keeping system to pro-
vide the needed data.”
But it is in the wider integration of record keeping with
target setting into a general systematization of work across the
factory that the Springfield Armory precedents seem particu-
larly influential. At this early stage, productivity gains and cost
reductions were not achievable through automation alone,
since, as Hoke [1990, p. 182] stressed, only part manufacture,
not assembly, was automated, down through the 1880s at least.
As yet:
. . . Waltham’s mechanics, like their counterparts in the
typewriter industry, perfected the techniques to mass
57Both goals come across in the data set out in Hoke’s [1990] tables. Ma-
chinery investment goes up year on year even in the crisis year of 1862. The
reduction in man-days of labor per watch continues though at a lower rate,
down to 2.2 in 1883 and 1.5 in 1905. The ratio of labor to output appears to
have been tracked as an important key to profitability. Robins, in his 1867
report, observes that “the gain in number of watches made [has been] . . . forty
percent, while the average number of hands has . . . increased . . . about 12+%”
[Hoke, 1990, p. 248].
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produce parts, but still relied heavily on hand assembly
and adjusting.
Much of WWC’s economic success therefore came from its
success in implementing system across this great divide. That
system was not simply given, but made. Based on Hoke’s evi-
dence, it appears to have been made by directly copying the
Springfield disciplinary organizational regime, along with
adopting its commitment to developing as much automation as
possible, via research in the machine shop. As Hoke [1990, p.
181] put it: “The most important transfer of technology from
the armories to the watch factories was the imposition of a
rigid system of organization and the elevation of the machine
shop to a position of supremacy.”58
From among the skilled mechanics hired following the refi-
nancing of 1858, Hoke [1990, pp. 189-190] singled out a few key
individuals, in particular James Shepard, who was hired di-
rectly from the Armory, and Ambrose Webster, who “came via
the Springfield Tool Company having served an apprenticeship
at the Springfield Armory.” According to Edward Marsh, who
came as Webster’s apprentice and later rose to be general man-
ager and the company’s historian, Webster was the most signifi-
cant single individual in the reorganization of the work process,
the man who realized “the imperative need of ‘system’ in creat-
ing and maintaining a successful manufacturing enterprise”
[Hoke, 1990, p. 191]. Marsh credits Webster with the two cru-
cial innovations: (1) securing agreement for treating the ma-
chining department not as a “burden” but as the potential
source of competitive advantage via its research into automa-
tion; and (2) applying “system” via a standardizing principle.
This he introduced first within the machine shop which then
“led to the standardization of sizes of certain ‘spindles’ and
58The manufacturing situation was, in this respect, precisely analogous to
that at Springfield where, up until the Civil War, parts were also increasingly
manufactured by machine but still assembled manually. But then, the whole
point of Tyler’s study there had been to impose time and performance stand-
ards on each individual task, whether manufacturing or assembly, in order to
speed up and smooth the overall production of the musket as a whole, includ-
ing the transfer of work-in-progress from shop to shop. This was the heart of
the Springfield system, where the outcome had been that even highly skilled
manufacturing tasks undertaken by hand, such as barrelwelding, showed the
disciplinary outcome of productivity rises combined with falls in unit costs
from 1841 on [Hoskin and Macve, 1988, pp. 44-45].
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‘bushings’ which were common to a variety of uses” [Marsh,
cited in Hoke, 1990, p. 191].
This standardized approach to parts was combined with a
normalization of activity within departments and its coordina-
tion across the whole manufacturing process. It is not clear if
Hoke saw this as all due to Webster. On the one hand, he [1990,
p. 191] credited Webster for having been “able to structure the
work within the factory, and insist on a series of standard
measurements to which the individual operatives were required
to conform.” On the other, when discussing factory organiza-
tion in more detail, Hoke [1990, p. 242] simply said:
At least as early as 1863, and probably by 1857, the
Waltham Watch Company developed functionally
differentiated departments staffed by a highly skilled
and specialized workforce coordinated by the Super-
intendent.
In either event, Hoke was here describing an organizational
setup precisely like that implemented at Springfield in 1841-
1842 under Daniel Tyler’s direction [Hoskin and Macve, 1994a].
Furthermore, as at Springfield, the primary evidence indicates
an immediate and dramatic economic effect, with the fall in
man-days production per watch from 21 to 3. In the absence as
yet of clear archival proof one way or the other, our own appli-
cation of Occam’s razor would suggest that the most likely
source of this whole set of innovations, technological and or-
ganizational, is the Springfield Armory, with the means of its
adoption being the men who had worked there.
What we therefore perceive, in more general terms, is a
translation of disciplinarity in both its aspects. As we see it, the
expert disciplinary knowledge of the engineer was put to work
to solve a new series of technological challenges which, if
solved, were seen as having huge potential economic payoff.
The coordination and control of work, period by period and
project by project, was made subject to constant writing, exam-
ining, and grading. Whatever its precise form may have been,
accounting was clearly integral to this process. At the strategic
level, there was a value calculus within which possible future
outcomes were weighed, while in the everyday practice of man-
agement there was planning and appraisal of cost and produc-
tion levels. Thus, a new industrial mass-production sector was
born, wherein the visible hand would henceforward rule and
where, as Chandler has recognized, new entrants could only
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compete by adopting and hoping to improve on the same vis-
ible-hand advantages.59
What, then, was the significance of the IC system in the
WWC story, and how does a disciplinary analysis enrich our
understanding of it? We suggest, tentatively, that the continua-
tion of IC until the 1870s may well have been one of those
contingent outcomes that frequently accompanies a major
transformation. Given the prevalence of IC systems in early
19th century private-sector companies, we surmise that IC was
already widely established in the watch-making industry.
Given the dependence on hand assembly, there would be
no particular reason for its abandonment, and perhaps some
cost in dissatisfaction among key worker/managers. Therefore,
so long as work coordination could be rendered susceptible to
system, it was unimportant whether the IC system itself was
replaced or not. What mattered, in implementing system, was
the panoply of disciplinary practices. What specifically made
the organizational difference was the importation of the range
of such practices from Springfield through the insider knowl-
edge of men such as Webster, supported by the Board. The fact
that an IC system had not been used at the Springfield Armory
would therefore be of no real significance.
We may suppose that, as a tradeoff, an existing culture of
IC was allowed to remain in place, except that, as in so many
classic tradeoffs, the existing culture was thereby irrevocably
remade, given its relentless circumscription by the new disci-
plinary regime. Here Fleischman and Tyson’s [1996] arguments
about the level of managerial knowledge about labor at WWC
under IC fit with our own interpretation. IC was then, presum-
59Unsurprisingly, the first would-be competitor firm, the Nashua Watch
Company, was formed by a breakaway group of WWC mechanics in 1859 who
“attempted to manufacture the first mass produced precision American time-
keeper” [Hoke, 1990, pp. 189, 197]. Unlike WWC, Nashua did go bankrupt in
1862, and many of its key workers were then hired back, along with their
expertise and design improvements. Indeed, a “Nashua Department” remained
as a separate wing within WWC, “producing the company’s high grade + plate
movements” [Hoke, 1990, p. 255]. (We do not know whether or not this was
also an IC unit.) In any event, competition, and the hiring away of key employ-
ees, continued apace. WWC’s major competitor from the mid-1860s was the
Elgin National Watch Company, founded in 1864, which hired seven WWC
men, including Charles Moseley as the factory’s superintendent. Thus, a
Latour-style network [Latour, 1987] of expert men and knowledge developed
new nodal points in a way that made the boundaries of particular organiza-
tional “structures” supernumerary.
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ably, maintainable into the 1870s because it was not a serious
detriment to the effective management of the company, either
at the day-to-day or strategic levels. Equally, though, it appears
from Fleischman and Tyson’s analysis not to have commanded
any great allegiance by then. It seems to have been discarded
with minimal disruption, with the foremen becoming straight-
forward line managers within the hierarchical structure. Per-
haps the erstwhile contractors had indeed become, as Fleisch-
man and Tyson suggested, members of a managerial hierarchy
in all but name, and so were relieved in the end to be freed
from any residual demands of the IC system. Perhaps its de-
mise was connected with the advancing automation of the pro-
duction process and with the new managerial challenges posed
as assembly also became increasingly automated.
In any event, what we would then see is a more general
dissemination of the disciplinary practices first introduced into
the economic world at Springfield, as on the railroads, to begin
remaking the economy in general.60  By 1900, production at
60We recognize that not all have bought this scenario, even where the
evidence appears strong. For instance, Hoke himself [1990, pp. 253-254] con-
cluded his analysis by saying that, although “watch factory mechanics and
entrepreneurs were initially enthralled with armory practice, and several me-
chanics employed at Waltham had previously worked at the Springfield Ar-
mory,” in the end “these mechanics borrowed very little from the Armory
directly.” At the same time, Hoke’s overall thesis is that the rise of the Ameri-
can System of manufactures was really the result of private-sector effort, car-
ried through by the “Ingenious Yankees” of his book’s title. Against that con-
clusion, we would point out that, on his own evidence, the two sectors where
genuine modern, high-tech manufacturing was successfully achieved were
watch and typewriter manufacturing. In both, one may discern the importance
of the Springfield Armory connection, once one abandons a focus on industry-
specific emendations of the Springfield template. We have summarized the
evidence concerning WWC here. The typewriter case is perhaps less crucial,
since it comes later, with the first successful handmade, mechanical typewrit-
ers dating to the early 1870s, and the first version of mass production at
Remington’s, to 1873 [Hoke, 1990, pp. 146-149]. But Remington, of course,
had its own earlier Springfield connection. Having begun as an arms manufac-
turer, it was now looking to expand its generic skills to new potential products
and markets, such as sewing machines. Its first move in each case was there-
fore, on the Springfield model, to produce a “pattern machine, by which the
rest are to be manufactured.” It is not clear how effective the work-discipline
was at Remington. Perhaps because of this diversification, it failed and was
relaunched in the 1880s. The application of system may nonetheless be dis-
cernible in the organization of typewriter production; by 1886, Remington
carried out subassembly in three departments before final inspection [Hoke,
1990, p. 167]. But by this time, a more generalized move to work-discipline
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WWC was driven by “pneumatically controlled, self-feeding,
self-acting, self-gauging, automatic machine tools.” Perhaps as
early as 1890, women were sitting at banks of automatic ma-
chine tools on “roller chairs.” These were set on “miniature
railroad tracks in front of some benches which allowed an op-
erative to slide her wheeled chair past a row of automatic ma-
chines, inserting wire into one end of each machine and collect-
ing finished, interchangeable parts from the other end” [Hoke,
1990, p. 181]. At which point, the genealogy of managerialism
moves on yet another generation, reproducing Dennison’s own
experience on his visit to the Springfield Armory. As Hoke
[1990, p. 255] remarked, in concluding the WWC episode:
“Henry Ford was reportedly inspired to manufacture automo-
biles by his trip through the WWC.”61
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